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The question of whether hwnanitarian interventions are a lawful use of arn1ed force is an important 
topic in contemporary international law. The elevated status of human rights and their international acceptance 
have led to an emergence of the use of military means when hwnan rights are infringed. Thus, there is a nexus 
between hwnan rights law and the law of armed conflict. 
At first glance, a right to hwnanitarian intervention runs directly counter to the UN-Charter's basic 
principles of the prohibition of the use of force and non-intervention . However, these principles are not absolute 
ones but allow exceptions. One such exception can be found in customary international law. An examination of 
several multilateral interventions which took place since the 1990s, with particular regard to NATO ' s military 
actions in Kosovo, shows that a customary right to humanitarian intervention has emerged at least in the 
"western" world. This local customary international law exists alongside international treaty law. 
Respect for the strict limitations which the UN-Charter sets on the legality of the use of armed force and 
anticipation of a possible abuse of a right to hun1anitarian intervention make it necessary to clarify strict 
elements for the justification of the use of armed force on humanitarian grounds. TI1e danger of improper use of 
the right to hwnanitarian intervention is contained when stringent rules are set and also kept. Thus, from the 
academic debate a test of whether humanitarian interventions are justified consists of the following elements: 
• Convincing evidence of massive hwnan rights violations; 
• Priority of conflict prevention; 
• Priority of self-help; 
• Actions must be taken by a legitimate actor; 
• Actors show respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty rights of the intervened 
state; 
• Actions are necessary; 
• Actions are proportional. 
However, the complexity of international relations reqmres the maintenance of a certain grade of 
flexibility when the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention is investigated. The determination of whether a 
hw11anitarian intervention is a lawful act or a breach of international law remains on a case by case basis. 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper ( excluding title page, abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 15, 889 words. 




There is much debate on the question of whether the use of armed force on 
the territory of a foreign state can be justified on humanitarian grounds, and whether 
it is a breach of international law. It is of special interest as the United Nations and 
its legal framework regained international importance after the end of the Cold War. 
"The new harmony on the Security Council following the end of the Cold War 
enabled States acting under the authority of the Security Council to undertake 
forceful actions on humanitarian grounds."' 
While one stream in the literature accepts the use of armed force on behalf of 
the protection of human rights only if the strict rules of international law and 
especially of the Charter of the United Nations (UN-Charter) are kept,2 the other 
opinion regards the use of armed force in humanitarian interventions as compatible 
with the provisions of international law even in cases where the narrow wording of 
the international legal framework does not apply. 3 This dispute reached its peak after 
the Kosovo crisis where international forces led by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) started air strikes against former Yugoslavia because the 
Yugoslavian government committed violations of human rights against the Albanian 
population in Kosovo. The use of armed force in the Kosovo crisis was the first 
humanitarian intervention without a resolution by the United Nations Security 
Council (UN-SC) after the UN-Charter came into force in 19454 and also "the first 
internationally sanctioned military action in the name of human rights ... rather than 
1 Judith Gardam Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2004) 147-8; see also UNGA "A more secured world: our shared responsibility, 
Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes" (2 December 2004) N 59/ 565, 
para 12 ["UN High-level Panel"] www.un .org/secureworld/report.pdf (accessed I 8 February 2008); 
Brian Urquhart "The UN and International Security after the Cold War" in Adam Roberts and 
Benedict Kingsbury United Nations, Devided World (2 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) 81-2 ; see 
also David J Scheffer "Toward a Modem Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention" ( 1991-1992) 23 U 
Toi L Rev 253, 258. 
2 Albrecht Randelzhofer in Bruno Simma (ed) Charter of the United Nations: A Commenta,y (2 ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) Article 2 (4), para 55; Brownlie, "Humanitarian Intervention" 
in John Norton Moore (ed) Law and Civil War in the Modern World (Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1974) 217; Yoram Din stein War, Aggression and Se{f-Defence (4 ed, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005) 71-3 and 90. 
3 Richard B Lilich "Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive 
Alternatives" in John Norten Moore (ed) Lall' and Civil War in the Modern World (John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1974) 229; Fernando R Teson Humanitarian Intervention: An lnqui1y 
into Lall' and Morality (3 ed, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, 2005); see also Budislav Vukas 
"Humanitarian Intervention and International Responsibility" in Maurizio Ragazzi (ed) International 
Responsibility Today Essays in Memo,y of Oscar Schachter (Martin us Nijhoff Publischers, Leiden, 
2005) 238 who pleads for a "duty to intervene". 
4 Charlotte Ku and Harold K Jakobson (eds) Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in 
International law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 98. 
4 
international security. " 5 At the centerpoint of the discussion is the lack of an easily 
identifiable legal basis for humanitarian interventions in international law. 
After providi3/1g background information about the term and the history of 
humanitarian interventions, this paper explains the role of human rights as a catalyst 
for the use of armed force. Following this, the regulations for the use of armed force 
are investigated. In the centre of such an explanation is Article 2 (4) of the UN-
Charter which contains two basic principles of international law namely the 
prohibition of the threat or the use of force6 and the principle of non-intervention. 7 
This paper will examine these principles and also take into account the exceptions 
which are explicitly mentioned in the UN-Charter. 
Beside the analysis of the explicit wording of the Charter the question 1s 
raised as to whether a customary international law to humanitarian intervention has 
emerged. 8 The idea of humanitarian intervention as part of customary international 
law arose after the NATO troops acted in Kosovo without authorization by the UN-
SC. This paper investigates whether a customary international law of humanitarian 
intervention exists. Special attention will be given to a further description of the 
elements and boundaries of such a customary law. If humanitarian interventions are a 
lawful use of armed force, then their limits need to be determined. 
II THE TERM "HUMANITARIAN INTER VENT/ON" 
Before coming to a closer description of what the term "humanitarian 
intervention" means it is important to state that definitions in international law are 
typically disputed and not as clear as the terms in domestic jurisdictions. "With no 
centralized legislature, the rules and norms of international law ... are less apparent 
and less precise than those found in national laws. "9 This also means that the term of 
"humanitarian intervention" is at the centre of various academic discussions. 
5 David Chandler From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond (2 ed, Pluto Press, London, 2006) 50; John J 
Merria "Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention" (2000) 33 Case W Res L Rev 111 , 113; 
see also Richard A Falk "Kosovo, World Order, and the Future oflntemational Law" ( 1999) 93 Am J 
lnt ' l L 847,848. 
6 Ulrich Beyerl in "Humanitarian Intervention" i.n Rudolf Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Lail' (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1995) 927. 
7 Georg Nolte in Bruno Simma (ed) Charter of the United Nations: A Commentmy (2 ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2002) Article 2 (7), para 7. 
8 See Antonio Cassese "A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio 
Neccessitatis" ( 1999) I O EJIL 792, 798; Randelzhofer, above n 2, para 56. 
9 Sean D Murphy Humanitarian Inte,wntion (University of Pennsylvania Press, Phildadelphia, 1996) 
7. 
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The definition of "humanitarian interventions" developed by Ian Brownlie as 
"the threat or use of armed force by a state, a belligerent community, or an 
international organization, with the object of protecting human rights" 10 is helpful. 
Within this sentence it becomes clear, that there are at least three different types of 
humanitarian interventions on behalf of the protection of human rights. First, there 
are unilateral humanitarian interventions which are lead by a single state. Secondly, 
multilateral humanitarian interventions are lead by a confederation of states and 
thirdly there are multilateral humanitarian interventions lead by international 
organizations such as the UN. 
Nevertheless, Brownlie's definition can not be seen as an exhaustive one 
because it leaves out the important delineation of humanitarian intervention from 
rescue operations for the State's own nationals abroad. 11 ''Unlike efforts to protect a 
State's national abroad, which also usually occur on humanitarian grounds, the 
objective of humanitarian intervention is the protection of foreign nationals." 12 A 
more precise definition can be found in Murphy when he says that: 13 
Humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force by a state, group of states or 
international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of 
the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human 
rights." 
It is important to distinguish rescue operations for the state's own nationals 
from humanitarian intervention for nationals of the state in which the intervention 
occurs because those two possible infringements of a state's territorial integrity have 
to be weighed differently. Rescue operations are typically of a short nature and 
therefore have less effect on the power and sovereignty of a foreign government than 
humanitarian interventions have. Some authors link the protection of the state's own 
nationals abroad with the state's right to self defence and Article 51 UN-Charter14 
while others understand the rescue operations to be a rule of customary international 
law. 15 However, in both opinions rescue operations for the security of the population 
of the intervening state appear easier to justify than humanitarian interventions in the 
10 Brownlie, above n 2, 217 . 
11 See Vukas, above n 3, 236 who uses the tern1 of " humanitarian assistance". 12 Randelzhofer, above n 2, Article 2 (4) para 53. 
13 Murphy, above n 9, 11-2. 
14 Dinstein, above n 2, 324; Beyerl in , above n 6, 926. 
15 Randelzhofer, above n 2, Article 51 , para 27. 
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common sense "and [therefore] have gained ... acceptance as a lawful act" 16 m 
international law. 17 
Another advantage of Murphy's definition of a humanitarian intervention is 
the necessity of "internationally recognized" human rights. This contributes to the 
fact that each nation interprets the value of every single human right differently. The 
international acceptance of a human right helps to measure the value of the right in 
question and therefore is useful to determine whether a justifiable humanitarian 
intervention took place. Typically humanitarian interventions are regarded as a 
lawful use of armed force only when a violation of a certain degree of international 
accepted human rights took place. 
III HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The analysis of the historical background of humanitarian interventions has to 
be separated into two parts. When the UN-Charter came into force in 1945, this was 
an important step for the codification of international law. The wording of the 
Charter contributed to the certainty of the letter of the law and also set limits to the 
rights of the states in international relationships. Nevertheless, the law on the 
legitimacy of the use of armed force is not "simply a product of the United at ions 
Charter"' 8 but has to be investigated also in a pre-Charter context as the "pre-1945 
rules still affect the scope of a state's rights and obligations under current 
international law." 19 Therefore, the explanation of the historical background of 
humanitarian interventions is divided in a pre- and a post-Charter part. 
A Humanitarian Intervention pre 1945 
The question whether humanitarian interventions are a legal use of armed 
force has already been discussed before the UN-Chai1er came into force. The 
justifiable use of armed force has always been an important part of international law. 
The doctrine of just wars, which means that the use of force can be legal under 
certain circumstances, "can be traced back ... [to the times of] ancient Rome"20 and 
16 Murphy, above n 9, 16; see also Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds) Oppenheim 's International 
Lall' (9 ed, Longman , Harlow, 1992) 440-2. 
17 Compare Beyerlin, above n 6, 928 . 
18 Martin Dixon Textbook on l111ernatio11al Lall' (5 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 290. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Dinstein, above n 2, 63 ; see also Murphy, above n 9, 39. 
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has been discussed ever since. 21 By the end of the 20th century the just war theory 
regained importance especially in international human rights law because "strong 
doctrinal support developed in favour of legitimizing"22 the use of armed force when 
human rights are violated. 
Although many authors in the present literature argue for the lawfulness of 
humanitarian interventions by quoting pre-Charter literature as a proof, it is doubted 
that humanitarian interventions were generally accepted as a legal use of force or 
even as customary international law.23 Only a few of the cases which were taken as a 
reference for the acknowledgement of humanitarian intervention in the pre-Charter 
period "really prove to be genuine examples of humanitarian intervention."24 In this 
respect, Hugo Grotius examined that humanitarian intervention "may often be used 
as the cover of ambitious designs."25 The excuse of humanitarian intervention has 
often been used ''to trump sovereignty."26 The long history of misuse of armed force 
which was under the guise of humanitarian reasons has contributed to the difficulties 
of justifying humanitarian interventions in our present time. 
Nevertheless, there exist examples of "true" humanitarian interventions on 
behalf of the protection of human rights in the pre-Charter period.27 Maybe the most 
obvious example for an early humanitarian intervention which did not aim at 
territorial advantages but only on the protection of human rights, in particular the 
protection of the Christian population, was the French intervention in Syria in 
1860.28 The French intervention was supported by Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and 
Russia who signed up two protocols in August and September 1860 ''wishing to stop 
2 1 Dinstein, above n 2, 63-73 ; see also Malcolm N Shaw International Law (5 ed , Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 1013-17; Rebecca MM Wallace International Law (5 ed , Sweet 
and Maxwell, London, 2005) 277 ; Joseph Boyle "Traditional Just War Theory and Humanitarian 
Intervention" in Terry Nardin and Melissa S William s (eds) Humanitarian Intervention (New York 
University Press, New York, 2006) 31 , 44-54, who analyses the legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention in the light of the just war theory. 
22 Dinstein, above n 2, 71. 
23 J L Holzgrefe "The humanitarian intervention debate" in J L Holzgrefe and Robert O Keohane (eds) 
Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 15, 46. 
24 Vukas, above n 3, 235 ; Beyerlin, above n 6, 927. 
25 2 H. Grotius, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (On the Law of War and Peace) , bk. 3, 
eh. 15, para. 8. 
26 Ramesh Thakur The United Nations, Peace and Security (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2006) 251. 
27 See Robert Kolb "Note on humanitarian intervention" in international Review of the Red Cross 849 
(March 2003) 119, l 22 
www. icrc.org/Web/eng/sitee11 g0.11sflh tmlall /5LPKFO/$File/irrc 849 Kolb.pdf (accessed 18 February 
2008). 
28 Beyerl in , above 11 6, 927 ; Francoise Bouchet-Saulnier The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law (2 
ed, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham , 2007) 23 J; Merria , above 11 5, 119. 
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the effusion of blood in Syria."29 The first protocoI3° contained the agreement that up 
to 12, OOO European troops may be sent to Syria to re-establish a state of law while in 
the second protocol it was ensured that "the contracting powers do not seek for ... 
any territorial advantages, any exclusive influence, or any concession with regard to 
the commerce of their subjects."31 
This historical example stresses that humanitarian interventions were known 
in the pre-Charter period. Nevertheless, one problem of this time was that "prior to 
1945 there was no meaningful law of human rights."32 However, even in this period 
where "individuals were then only objects and not subjects of international law"33 
one document of international law has to be mentioned which is important on the 
question of whether humanitarian interventions are a lawful use of armed force in 
present times. This is the Kellog-Briand Pact which lastingly influenced the 
historical development of the right to use anned force. Inspired by the devastating 
results of the brutal World War I the idea for "the creation of an institution that 
would prevent future wars"34 came up. The Kellog-Briand pact, named after the 
French Foreign Minister Briand and the United States Secretary of State Kellog, was 
adopted in Paris on the 27t11 of August 1928. The treaty was originally signed by 15 
states, among them "great powers" such as France, Great Britain and the United 
States. Later, "nearly all States existing at the time became parties to the Pact."35 The 
Parties agreed to "outlaw war and renounce it as an instrument of national policy"36 
apart from defensive wars. Although this treaty could not prevent World War II it is 
still "a milestone in the history of the law of war and general international law [as i]t 
represents a revolutionary change of attitude towards war in the international 
conununity."37 The pact showed for the first time "that a general ban on 'war' was 
politically and legally possible."38 
29 Louis B Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal international Protection of Human Rights (Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Indianapolis, 1973) 156, who reprints an extract of the original documents. 
30 Ibid, 157. 
31 Ibid, 158; see also Murphy, above n 9, 53-4. 
32 Teson, above n 3, 220. 
33 Ibid; see also Hersch Lauterpacht (ed) International Lall' (8 ed, Longrnans, London, 1955) 640-1 
and 736-8. 
34 Murphy, above n 9, 57. 
35 Randelzhofer, above n 2, Article 2 (4 ), para I 0. 
36 Cynthia D Wallace "Kellog-Briand Pact" in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopaedia of Public 
international Lall' (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1995) 77. 
37 Ibid, 79. 
38 Dixon, above n 18, 291. 
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Connecting the provisions of the Kellog-Briand Pact with the question of the 
lawfulness of humanitarian interventions, it must be noticed that even if the treaty 
did not explicitly regulate the right to humanitarian intervention "its tenor is to 
preclude the initiation of war by any nation when an international controversy 
arises."39 This means that the justification of humanitarian interventions has become 
more difficult than it was before.40 As "the principles of the Kellog-Briand Pact are 
now embodied in the United Nations Charter"41 this effect of the Pact leads us to the 
analysis of the post-Charter period. 
B Humanitarian Intervention post 1945 
For the investigation of the historical development in the post-Charter period 
it is important to note that the context around the threat of human rights' violations 
has changed. While until the middle of the 20th century it was colonialists 
(predominantly European ones) who violated human rights of the people in colonised 
countries, by the end of the 20th century threats to human rights have mostly been 
caused by the people's own governments.42 The threat of human rights through a 
state's own government as a major current human rights concern was also influenced 
by the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War led to a rise of intrastate wars 
and the destabilization of broader areas.43 These internal conflicts often go hand in 
hand with the suppression of a particular ethnic group and therefore human rights 
violations which do not necessarily cross borders. 
The invention of the UN-Charter in 1945 "had a dramatic impact on classic 
international law. "44 Article 1 of the UN-Charter lays down its main purpose which 
is to "maintain international peace and security." This demands "the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of peace." Even though the Charter does not 
contain any explicit rules for humanitarian interventions, the wording of Article 1 of 
39 Murphy, above n 9, 60. 
40 Beyerlin, above n 6, 927. 
41 Cynthia D Wallace, above n 36, 78. 
42 Din stein, above n 2, 70- 1; see also Christine Gray "The Use of Force and the International Legal 
Order" in Malcolm D Evans (ed) International Law (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 
591 ["The Use of Force and the lnternational Legal Order"]; see also "UN High-level Panel", above n 
I, para 2-3, where an explanation of the colonial systems in the first 30 years of the UN is given. 
43 Shepard Foreman and Andrew Grene "Collaborating with Regional Organizations" in David M 
Malone (ed) The UN Security Council (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2004) 302; Emily 
Schroeder "The Kosovo Crisis: Humanitarian ln1perative versus International Law" (2004) 28 
Fletcher F World Aff 179, 179; see also Rebecca MM Wallace, above n 21, 287; Urquart, above n 1 
87; compare "UN High-level Panel", above n 1, para 11 and 74 where the decrease of inter-state wars 
since the end of the Cold War is described. 
44 Teson, above n 3, 219; see also Beyerlin, above n 6, 927. 
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the UN-Charter and especially the prohibition of the threat or use of armed force in 
Article 2 (4) UN-Charter, seems to preclude the justification of humanitarian 
interventions. 45 However, Chapter VII of the UN-Charter, which regulates actions of 
the UN when there are threats to peace, and especially Article 51 with the right to 
self defence contains exceptions from Article 2 ( 4) which means that the prohibition 
of the use of force is not an absolute one.46 
Within the more than 50 years of existence of the UN-Charter various 
interventions took place in which the use of armed force claimed to be justified 
because of the protection of human rights. A few prominent examples are the 
intervention of India in Bangladesh on behalf of the protection of East Pakistan's 
population in 1971, the 1979 invasion of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia where the 
Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot killed more than I million people within only 4 years or 
Tanzania's intervention in Uganda to overthrow the regime ofldi Amin in the same 
year. All of these interventions have been an object of controversial legal disputes 
with regards to their character as humanitarian interventions. 47 While some authors 
consider them to be genuine examples for humanitarian interventions,48 others reject 
this opinion.49 However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an analysis 
about this dispute. But the given examples plus the recent case of NATO 
bombardments in Kosovo, which also is a highly controversial issue, 50 illustrate that 
the discussion on whether the use of armed force can be justified as a humanitarian 
intervention is an important question in contemporary human rights law. 
V HUMAN RIGHTS AS A CATALYST FOR THE USE OF ARMED 
FORCE 
Events in contemporary history as, for example, NATO's actions in Kosovo 
have shown that the international community accepts more and more the use of 
45 See Din stein , above n 2, 71. 
46 See Shaw, above n 21, 1017. 
47 Among others compare Teson, above n 3, 219-78 ; Murphy, above n 9, Chapter 4; see also Barry M 
Benjamin "Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention : Legalizing the Use of Force to Prevent Human 
Rights Atrocities" (1992) 16 Fordham lnt'l L J 120, 133-4, 137-8 and 143. 
48 Merria, above n 5, 123-4; Benjamin, above n 47, 151. 
49 Christine Gray International Law and the Use of Force (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2004) 32 . 
50 See Schroeder, above n 43 ; Bruno Simma "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" 
( 1999) I O EJIL I; Antonio Cassese "Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International 
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countem1easures in the World Community?" (1999) 10 EJIL 
23 ["Ex inuria ius oritur"]; Gray, above n 49, 37 . 
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extreme measures, including the use of armed force, to protect human rights. 51 This 
could mean that human rights serve as a catalyst for the use of armed force. 
A cornerstone for the increasing importance of human rights within the last 
50 years is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was 
approved by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on the 10th December 1948. 52 Even 
though not a binding treaty, this document is the first codification of human rights 
that formulated "a unitary and universally valid concept of what values all States 
should cherish. " 53 Since then, several other international documents concerning 
fundamental human rights have been adopted. Examples are the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 54 the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights55 or the recently adopted Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. 56 The trend in the international community to codify human 
rights proves their raising importance in international law. 57 This is underlined by the 
fact that some basic human rights have emerged even on the level of jus cogens 
norms. 58 
The emergence of the value of human rights in the international community 
had a deep impact on the international law on the use of armed force. This becomes 
obvious when the UN's tendency to consider human rights violations as a threat to 
peace as in the meaning of Chapter VII of the UN-Charter is taken into account. 59 
For example, atrocities of the Iraqi government against the Kurdish minority in 
Northern Iraq were constituted by the UN-SC to be a threat to peace.60 According to 
5 1 See "Ex iniuria ius oritur", above n 50, 26; see also Rebecca M M Wallace, above n 21, 289; Gray, 
above n 49, 33-7 ; Merria, above n 5, 12 l. 
52 UNGA Resolution 217 A (III) ( I O December I 948). 
53 Antonio Cassese International Law (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 380 
["International Law"]; see also Leland M Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Anne Patricia Simons 
Charter of the United Nations (3 ed, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969) 377-8. 
54 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 17 l. 
55 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ( 16 December 1966) 993 UNTS 
3. 
56 UNGA "United Nations Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples" ( 12 September 2007) 
N61 /L.67. 
57 See Thomas M Franck Fairness in International law and Institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1995) 264; "International Law", above n 53, 396-8. 
58 See Lauri Hannikainen Peremp101y Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law (Finish Lawyers ' 
Publishing Company, Helsinki, 1988) 718, who lists norms about, for example, slavery, genocide, 
torture and arbitrary killings as jus cogens nonns. 
59 Jochen Frowein and Nico Krisch in Bruno Simma (ed) Charter of the United Nations: A 
CommentCll)I (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) Article 39, paras 19-21; " International 
Law", above n 53,383; but see Pratap Bhanu Meta "From State Sovereignty to Human Security (via 
Institutions?)" in Nardin and Williams, above n 21, 259, 273. 
60 UNSC Resolution 688 (5 April 1991) S/RES/688/1991 para l; Franck, above n 57, 235; Frowein 
and Krisch, above n 59, para 20; see also UNSC Resolution 794 (3 December 1992) S/RES/794/1992 
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Article 43 of the UN-Charter, the determination of such a threat to peace entitles the 
UN-SC to authorize the use of armed force, even though it is only a possible last 
resort. 
All in all, the elevated status and high value that human rights have gained 
within the last 50 years has lead to the emergence of the use of military means when 
human rights are infringed. Thus, human rights law and the law of armed conflict are 
no more seen as two isolated aspects of international law, as they were until the 
middle of the 20 th century. 61 Rather there is a nexus. It has become accepted that the 
international mandate to protect human rights also "requires the use of force."62 "In 
other words, the human rights regime has gone over to the offensive"63 and human 
rights have become a catalyst for the use of armed force. 
V INTERNATIONAL RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE 
The use of armed force is subject to several rules of international law which 
regulate the circumstances under which it is lawful to use military means against 
another sovereign state. Even though the right to use force in the special case of 
humanitarian intervention is not explicitly regulated, these rules give important 
indications for the legality or illegality of interventions on behalf of the protection of 
human rights. The most important piece of international legislation which has to be 
taken into account is Article 2 (4) of the UN-Charter. Randelzhofer observes that 
"today Art[icle] 2 (4) constitutes the basis of any discussion on the problem of the 
use of force."64 Another part of international legislation which allows the use of 
armed force when human rights are violated is the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime Genocide. 65 
A Provisions of Article 2 (4) and Article 2 (7) of the UN-Charter 
Article 2 (4) of the UN-Charter contains the principle of the prohibition of the 
use of force. Moreover, the principle of non intervention can be derived from this 
page I on Somalia; UNSC Resolution 929 (22 June 1994) S/RES/929/1994 on Rwanda; UNSC 
Resolution 1296 (19 April 2000) S/RES/1296/2000 para 5. 
6 1 Colonel Draper "The Relationship between the Human Rights Regime and the Law of Armed 
Conflicts" (1971) I Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 191 , 193. 
62 W Michael Reisman "Kosovo's Antinomies" (1999) 93 Am J Int ' l L 860,862 . 
63 Draper, above n 61, 195. 
64 Randelzhofer, above n 2, Article 2 (4) para 12. 
65 UNGA Resolution 260 A (III) (9 December 1948); compare Yukas, above n 3, 237 ; Dinstein , above 
11 2, 71. 
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article in connection with Article 2 (7) UN-Charter.66 As every single element of 
these two basic principles is the focus of academic disputes which can not be solved 
within this work, this paper will be content with a short explanation of these 
principles and then explain the principles' exceptions. 
I The principle of the prohibition of the use of force 
The prohibition of the use of force has its origin in the Kellog-Briand Pact but 
improved the prohibition of "only" war to a more general prohibition of the use of 
armed force. 67 "The reference to 'force' rather than war is beneficial and covers 
situations in which violence is employed which fall short of the technical 
requirements of the state of war [as for example reprisals]."68 Furthermore, it covers 
not only an actual use of force but also the mere threat of force which means that the 
scope of Article 2 (4) of the Charter also glances at future events when "the 
envisaged use of force ... itself [is] unlawful. "69 
This wide wording of Article 2 ( 4) indicates that the principle of the 
prohibition of the use or the threat of force has to be interpreted in a broad sense and 
has to be seen as the elementary rule for international relationships. Therefore, 
"states and commentators generally agree that the prohibition of the use of force is 
not only treaty and customary law but also ius cogens."70 The significance of Article 
2 (4) becomes obvious when Henkin describes it as ''the heart of the United Nations 
Chart er." 71 
2 The principle of non-intervention 
The Declaration of Principles of International Law concernmg Friendly 
relations and Cooperation between States explains the principle of non-intervention 
as "no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of another State."72 The 
66 Nolte, above n 7, Article 2 (7) para 7. 
67 Randelzhofer, above n 2, Article 2 (4) para 14. 
68 Shaw, above n 21 , 1018. 
69 [bid , 1020. 
70 Gray, above n 49, 29; see also Case Concerning Militcuy and Paramilita,y Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Nicaragua case) (Juridiction and Admissibility) 
[1986] [CJ Rep 14, para 190 Judgment ofthe majority; Hannikainen, above n 58,717; see also Co,fu 
Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [ 1949] ICJ Rep 4 , 35. 
71 Louis Henkin "The Reports of the Death of Article 2 ( 4) are Greatly Exaggerated" ( 1971) 65 Arn J 
Int'l L 544. 
72 UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970); see also Jennings and Watts, above n 16, 430, 
who list several other documents with similar provi sions. 
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principle of non-intervention is based on the idea of the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the state and is a "part of customary international law." 73 This idea 
first was realized after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 when nation states started to 
develop in Europe. "It is at that stage that the idea of sovereignty was first 
enunciated, proclaiming that sovereign rulers alone where responsible for 
administering their internal affairs as they see fit to advance the interests of the 
state. "74 
Today, the idea of sovereignty is laid down in Article 2 (7) of the UN-Charter 
even if the wording of the Charter does not explicitly mention it. 75 Article 2 (7) says 
that "nothing ... in the ... Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters . . . within the domestic jurisdiction" and therefore embodies "a most 
important aspect of the basic relationship between the Organization and the member 
States."76 Furthermore, Article 2 (4) of the Charter is a legal source of this principle. 
The use of force is the most drastic violation of the territorial integrity of a foreign 
country and when Article 2 (4) prohibits the use of force this also means a protection 
of the sovereignty of states. This is underlined when the ICJ states in the Nicaragua 
case that "a breach of the customary principle of non-intervention will also ... 
constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations."77 
3 Interim result 
The prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention and 
therefore Article 2 (4) respectively Article 2 (7) of the Charter "run directly 
counter"78 to the legality of humanitarian intervention. According to Murphy's 
definition, 79 humanitarian intervention means a use of armed force and an intrusion 
in the territorial integrity of a foreign country even if they take place on behalf of the 
protection of human rights. However, the ban on the use of force and the principle of 
non-intervention are not absolute prohibitions as the Charter allows exceptions. 
73 Shaw, above n 21 , 1039. 
74 Murphy, above n 9, 42. 
75 Sabine von Schorlemer "Menschenrechte und 'hunrnnitare lnterventionen"' (2000) 2 lntemationale 
Politik, 41-2 ; Bouchet-Saulnier, above n 28, 230. 
76 Nolte, above n 7, Article 2 (7) para 3. 
77 Nicaragua case, above n 70, para 209 Judgment of the majority. 
78 Dixon, above n 18 , 305; see also Jennings and Watts, above n 16, 428. 
79 See above II, page 6. 
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B Exceptions to the Prohibition of the Use of Force and the Principle of Non-
Intervention 
The most important justification for an armed intervention in a foreign 
country and therefore exception to the prohibition of the use of force and the 
principle of non-intervention is the right to self defence which is laid down in Article 
51 of the UN-Charter. Furthermore, Chapter VII of the UN-Charter contains rules for 
the UN-SC to take action in cases of threats to peace. This paper does not aim at an 
exhaustive analysis of the relevant provisions of the Charter but will give an 
explanation of the most important elements which it demands for a legal use of 
armed force. Furthermore, attention will be given to the legal sources of the 
exceptions from the basic principles of Article 2 ( 4) and (7) UN-Charter. The legal 
source of the explicitly regulated exceptions on the prohibition of the use of force 
could give a clue to the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention as a non-written 
exception of the Charter. 
1 Right to self def ence, Article 51 UN-Charter 
Article 51 of the UN-Charter grants "the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs" and therefore explicitly regulates 
the right to self defence. The right to self defence has a long history. In 1837, where 
a legal dispute between the American and the British government about the 
justification of the destruction of the American steam boat "Caroline" took place, 80 
"the American Secretary of State laid down the essentials of self defence. " 81 In a 
letter he demanded from the British government "to show a necessity of self defence, 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation 
[and that the attack on the boat was not] unreasonable or excessive . .. and kept 
within [the rules of necessity]." 82 The elements of necessity and proportionality, 
which can be found within this letter, "are at the heart of self-defence in international 
law"83 and are acknowledged as elements for Article 51 of the UN-Charter. 84 
Therefore, the ICJ stated in the Nicaragua case that "self-defence would warrant 
only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond 
80 See R Y Jennings " The Caroline and McLeod Cases" ( 193 8) 32 Am J Int ' l L 82, 82 . 81 Shaw, above n 21 , 1025. 
82 Jennin gs, above n 80, 89. 
83 Shaw, above n 21 , I 031 . 
84 Randel zhofer , above 2, Article 51 para 42 ; Dinstein , above n 2, 208- 10; Gray, above n 49, 120; 
Gardam, above n 1, 6. 
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to it."85 "Necessity" in context of the right to self defence means "that the action 
must be by way of a last resort after all peaceful means have failed"86 while 
"proportionality" in international humanitarian law is understood as "prohibiting 
disproportionate attacks and means and methods of warfare causing superfluous 
in jury or unnecessary suffering. "87 
In the Nicaragua judgement the ICJ not only gave a description of the basic 
elements for a right to self defence but went beyond the scope of the treaty law of the 
UN-Charter when it "acknowledged the existence of [the right to self defence] under 
customary law."88 Therefore, the ICJ delivered an analysis of the source of the right 
to self defence when it stated that "it cannot . . . be held that Article 51 [UN-Charter] 
is a provision which ' subsumes or supervenes ' customary international law."89 
Accordingly, the right to self defence has its foundations not only in treaty law as a 
legal source but also in customary international law and this "customary law 
continue[s] to exist alongside treaty law"90 and "independently of Article 51 [UN-
Charter]."91 This determination is important as "customary self-defence may go 
beyond the right guaranteed by the Charter"92 and therefore may justify exceptions 
on the prohibitions on the use of force or the principle of non-intervention that are 
not explicitly listed in the UN-Charter. 
2 Collective enforcement actions authorized by the UN-SC, Chapter VII of the 
UN-Charter 
The second exception to the prohibition of the use of force can be found in 
Chapter VII of the UN-Charter which lays down "Actions with respect to Threats to 
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." According to Article 25 
of the UN-Charter, UN member states "agree to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council." Chapter VII of the Charter provides far reaching powers for 
the UN-SC and constitutes its function as an "international policeman". Therefore, 
Article 39 of the UN-Charter contains the task for the UN-SC ''to determine the 
85 Nicaragua case, above n 51 , para 176 Judgment of the majority; affirmed in Case Concerning Oil 
Platforms (Iran v United States of America) (2003) 42 ILM 1334, 1361 Judgment of the majority 
(ICJ); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion)[ 1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 
41. 
86 Gardam, above n I, 5. 
87 Ibid , 10. 
88 Randelzhofer, above n 2, Article 51 para 43 . 
89 Nicaragua case, above n 70, para 176 Judgment of the majority. 
90 Shaw, above n 21 , I 026. 
9 1 Rebecca MM Wallace, above n 21 , 284. 
92 Dixon, above n 18, 296. 
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existence of any threat to peace ... and . . . [to] make recommendations ... to 
maintain or restore international piece and security." According to Articles 41 and 42 
of the Charter, it is up to the UN-SC to decide about possible reactions on the threat 
of peace. Under Article 41 the use of armed force as a possible measure is excluded 
and therefore possible actions are restricted to economic or diplomatic sanctions for 
example, while Article 42 stipulates the use of armed forces if the measures listed in 
Article 41 have proved to be inadequate. These two steps of possible actions against 
a threat to peace stress the importance of the element of necessity which is required 
for the justification of the use of armed force. In this respect, "the Charter ... sets up 
an elaborate system that is designed to ensure that the use of force is indeed the last 
resort available to the [UN Security] Council. " 93 
3 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
Another example for exceptions to the principles of the prohibition of the use 
of armed force and non-intervention can be found in the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 94 Article 8 of this Convention 
enables the UN "to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they 
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide." 
"Action" in the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention "include[s] the use of force 
[which] can be undertaken on the basis of a decision of the UN-SC or the General 
Assembly, in order to prevent and suppress genocide."95 The reference of Article 8 of 
the Convention to the provisions of the UN-Charter indicates that also in the case of 
genocide the provisions of the UN-Charter as basic legal framework apply. 
C Interim Result 
The provisions of the UN-Charter show that the justification of the use of 
armed force underlies strict rules and only complies with the basic principle of the 
prohibition of the use of armed force and the principle of non-intervention if the 
narrow elements of the UN-Charter and especially of its Chapter VII are kept. 
According to Murphy's definition of humanitarian intervention, which is the 
basis of this paper, the right to self defence and therefore Article 51 of the UN-
93 Gardam, above n I, 6. 
94 UNGA Resolution 260 A (III) (9 December 1948). 
95 Vukas, above n 3, 237; see also Jennings and Watts, above n 16, 995 ; Bouchet-Saulnier, above n 28, 
234. 
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Charter is not suitable to justify humanitarian interventions as the protection of 
human rights of the nationals from a foreign state is not "an armed attack ... against 
a Member State of the United Nations" as in the meaning of Article 51 of the 
Charter. In fact the population of a foreign country are subject to human rights, but 
they are not a subject of international law and therefore not a member of the United 
ations. This could lead us to the conclusion that the use of armed force even on 
behalf of the protection of human rights is only justifiable when the UN-SC 
authorized the member state to take action and the strict procedures of Chapter VII of 
the Charter are kept.96 For example, this would mean that the ATO led air 
campaign in former Yugoslavia is a breach of international treaty law. 97 However, 
this conclusion does not sufficiently take the importance of customary international 
law as a second basic source of international law into consideration. 
VI HUMANITARIAN INTER VENT/ON AS CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In international law not only are treaties a basic legal source but so is 
customary international law which contains obligations, permissions and prohibitions 
for the states. This becomes obvious when Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) is taken into account. There it says that "the 
Court ... shall apply (a) international conventions ... [and] (b) international custom 
... as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." "Although this 
statute is technically only binding on the International Court of Justice, it is widely 
accepted as the authoritative statement of the sources of international law."98 
Therefore, it is important not only to analyse the text of the UN-Charter as to 
whether humanitarian interventions are a legal use of armed force, but also 
customary international law which "is the older and the original source of 
International Law. "99 
Customary international law is defined as "that law which has evolved from 
the practice or customs of the state." 100 The rules of customary international law are 
often of a great flexibility which is advantageous. In comparison, treaty law is often 
96 Din stein, above n 2, 71-2; Louis Henkin "Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian lntervention" 
(1999) 93 Arn J lnt'l L 824, 826. 
97 Randelzhofer, above n 2, Article 2 (4) para 56. 
98 J L Holzgrefe "The humanitarian intervention debate" in Holzgrefe and O Keohane, above n 23 , 37 . 99 Lauterpacht, above 11 33, 25 ; Merria, above n 5, 118. 
100 Dixon, above 11 18, 28. 
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bound by its narrow wording while customary international law "enables 
international law to develop in line with the needs of the time." 101 In this respect, 
especially the question of whether humanitarian interventions which were not 
authorized by the UN-SC are a lawful act or a breach of international law is an 
important aspect of contemporary international human rights law. There might be a 
present need for the justification of the use of armed force even in cases where the 
written rules of the strict international legal framework are not kept. Especially after 
1999 with the unauthorized NATO lead air strikes in the Kosovo conflict, where the 
provisions of Chapter VII of the UN-Charter were not applied, the need for a less 
formal understanding of the right for the use of armed force was formulated. For 
example, Wedgwood argues "against procedural perfectionism in times of 
emergency, when key normative principles [ of the UN-Charter] are at stake, and 
United Nations security machinery fails to work." 102 
Even though the Kosovo crisis gives important clues for the further analysis 
of the existence of an international custom of humanitarian intervention, it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to find an answer as to whether the actions of ATO in 
former Yugoslavia were a lawful act or a breach of international law. Rather this 
paper will investigate more generally whether humanitarian interventions have 
elevated to the level of customary international law. Therefore, further examination 
of the single elements of customary international law and whether they are fulfilled 
with regard to humanitarian interventions is needed. 
A Elements of Customary International Law 
Customary international law consists of two main elements. First, there is a 
need for a consistent state practice and secondly, the development of a binding rule 
of customary int~rnational law needs an opinio juris. 103 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ruth Wedgewood "NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia" (1999) 93 Arn J Lnt'l L 828, 833 ; see also 
Christine M Chinkin "Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War? (1999) 93 Am J Lnt'l L 841 ,843 . 
103 Enzo Cannizzaro and Paolo Palchetti "Customary International Law on the Use of Force ... at a 
Time of Perplexity'' in Enzo Cannizzaro and Paolo Palchetti Customw y International Lall' on the Use 
of Force (Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2005) I, 2; Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman 
"Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of international 
law" in Holzgrefe and Keohane, above n 23, 177, 179; "International Law", above n 53 , 157. 
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1 Consistent state practice as material element 
For the examination of whether there is a consistent state practice with regard 
to humanitarian intervention it is necessary to analyse material sources of 
international law. Possible guidelines for such an analysis are, for example, 
"diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, pre s releases, the opinions of 
official legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, ... legislation, ... judicial 
decisions ... and resolutions [of] the United ations General Assembly." 104 In 
addition, the examination of contemporary interventions is a helpful clue for the 
determination of a consistent state practice. For example, in the legal dispute about 
the lawfulness of NATO operations in Kosovo , Cassese formulates the question of 
whether "the A TO ... intervention at least rooted in and partially [was] justified by 
contemporary trends of the international comrnunity." 105 
The ICJ stresses the importance of the consistency of the state's practice as 
being essential for the formation of customary international law. Therefore, it 
formulated in the Asylum case "that the rule invoked [must prove to be] 111 
accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States." 106 This 
element causes difficulties especially in the area of humanitarian intervention "due to 
the highly political character of the law governing the use of force." 107 evertheless, 
relief is brought to this element when Brownlie states that "complete uniformity is 
not required." 108 
In the following part, this paper refers to certain cross-border interventions 
which took place in contemporary history which are regarded as important issues for 
the further determination of state practice on the use of armed force on behalf of the 
protection of human rights. In this regard, further analysis differentiates between the 
unilateral 109 interventions of the 1970s and multilateral 11 0 interventions which took 
place especially in the 1990s. Moreover, the European approach to humanitarian 
intervention shall be investigated. 
104 Iain Brownlie Principles <?f Public International Law (6 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003) 6 ("Principles of Public International Law"]; see also Rebecca MM Wallace, above n 21, 5; 
Dixon, above n 18, 29. 
105 "Ex iniuria ius oritur", above n 50, 25. 
106 Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [ 1950] ICJ Rep 266, 276 
Judgment of the majority. 
107 Cannizzaro and Palchetti , above n 103, 4. 
108 "Principles of Public International Law", above n 104, 7; see also Andreas Laursen Changing 
International Law to Meet Nell' Challenges (DJ0F Publishing, Copenhagen, 2006) 90. 
109 Unilateral in this context means interventions lead by a single state. 
110 Multilatreal means interventions lead by a group of states which are organized in an international 
organization such as NATO and UN or od1er multinational alliances of states. 
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(a) Unilateral interventions in the 1970s 
As Wedgwood reports, "humanitarian reasons have served as justification m 
Vietnam's displacement of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, India's invasion of 
East Pakistan in support of Bangladeshi independence [or] Tanzania's overthrow of 
ldi Amin in Uganda." 111 But whether these incidents, which all took place in the 
1970s, can serve as examples for a consistent state practice of humanitarian 
intervention is doubted in international literature. Some authors criticise, that the use 
of armed force in these cases was not justified by the intervening countries "on the 
basis of humanitarian action; rather the states using force focused mainly on self-
defence." 112 Critics also claim that the use of armed force for India, Vietnam and 
Tanzania was likely for more "egoistic" and national motives than humanitarian. 11 3 
However, these incidents are classical examples for unilateral interventions in 
which Murphy's definition of humanitarian interventions also applies. Nevertheless, 
they are a special case of the use of armed force because these interventions were led 
by single states. Therefore, they are hardly comparable with the multilateral 
interventions which took place within the last twenty years, for example, in orthern 
Iraq , Somalia or in the Kosovo. Therefore, "any scepticism of motive or result [of 
these unilateral interventions] does not necessarily impeach multilateral action" 114 
and at least the actions taken by India, Vietnam and Tanzania and the criticism 
thereof do not say anything against a consistent state practice of humanitarian 
intervention. 
As the author is of the opm1on that unilateral interventions are hardly 
comparable with the use of force by multilateral actors, the following part of this 
paper only refers to multilateral interventions. The lawfulness of unilateral military 
actions on humanitarian grounds has to be questioned separately. 
(b) Multilateral interventions in the 1990s 
It is important to take the 1990s multilateral interventions into account when 
considering the consistency of state practice. Examples of multilateral use of armed 
111 Wedgwood, above n I 02, 833; but see Murphy, above n 9, I 04, who states that Vietnam's primary 
justification for taking action in Cambodia was self defence and that the Vietnamese government only 
referred to human rights violations "in passing"; Scheffer, above n l , 255, who sta tes that Vietnam's 
"humanitarian considerations may have been minimal" but are nevertheless "noteworthy' '. 
112 Gray, above n 49, 32; see also Hol zgrefe in Holzgrefe and Keohane, above n 23, 48; DJ Harris 
Cases and Materials on International Lall' (6th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2004) 948. 
111 Chandler, above n 5, 164; see also JonatJ1an Charney "Anticipatory I lumanitarian Intervention in 
Kosovo" ( 1999) 93 Am J lnt ' l L 834, 836. 
114 Wedgwood, above n 102,833. 
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forces on behalf of the protection of human rights are the intervention in Liberia in 
1990 which was lead by the African Union and the UN and should protect the civil 
population from the consequences of a bloody civil war; the UN operated 
interventions in Iraq and Somalia in 1991 and 1992 to protect the human rights of 
minorities such as Kurds and Shiites in Iraq respectively to avoid widespread human 
rights violations in Somalia; the UN lead interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 
1992 until 1995 on behalf of the protection of the civilian population and the 1994 
intervention in Rwanda to protect the Tutsi minority from genocide by the Hutu. All 
these events serve to show the consistent trend in contemporary history that "the 
international community is increasingly intervening, through international bodies, in 
internal conflicts where human rights are in serious jeopardy." 11 5 Within the last 20 
years the idea emerged " in the international community that large-scale and 
systematic atrocities ... give rise to an aggravated form of state responsibility." 11 6 
Therefore, Wallace concludes that "the alleviation of human suffering appears to be 
taking precedence over the principle of State sovereignty, and there is evidence of a 
shift m the international ' s community' s position regarding humanitarian 
intervention." 11 7 
(c) Special case: Kosovo crisis 
Although the Kosovo crisis belongs in the same period of time and the ATO 
lead intervention was also a multilateral use of armed force, it does not fit in the 
series of interventions which were mentioned before. The lack of authorization by 
the UN-SC in the meaning of Chapter VII of the UN-Charter was new ground in 
history and makes the Kosovo conflict a special case. Nevertheless, even the lack of 
authorization by the UN-SC and therefore the special circumstances of the Kosovo 
intervention is an important clue for the analysi of whether a consistent state 
practice of humanitarian intervention exists. 
First, it has to be stres cd that the NATO operation was not "decided by a 
sole hegemonic power, but has been freely agreed upon by a group of countries, 
namely the 19 member states of NAT0," 11 8 which indicates a continuation in the 
practice of states on behalf of human rights' protection by international 
11 5 "Ex iniuria ius oritur", above n 50, 26; see al so Rebecca MM Wallace, above 11 21, 289. 
116 " Ex iniuria ius oritur", above n 50, 26. 
11 7 Rebecca MM Wallace, above 11 2 1, 289. 
118 Ibid ; Wedgwood, above n 102, 833 . 
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organizations. ''NATO can claim the legitimacy of a nineteen-nation decision 
process, and the normative commitments of a democratic Europe that even 
Yugoslavia wishes to join." 11 9 The then Secretary-General of the ATO, Javier 
Solana, stated in a press conference at the beginning of the military actions in 
Kosovo that the objective of the A TO allies is "to prevent more human suffering 
and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo." 120 This 
emphasizes the justification of the use of armed force on humanitarian grounds and 
therefore points out certain state practice by alliances to protect human rights. 
Secondly, even if the use of armed force was not authorized by the UN-SC, 
the A TO member states were not condemned by the majority of the international 
community for taking action in Kosovo. 121 Rather, on the third day of air strike 
operations by the NATO forces, the UN-SC refused a request of Belarus, India and 
Russia to condemn the actions taken in Kosovo. 122 The draft of a resolution 123 which 
claimed violations of Articles 2 (4), 24 and 53 of the UN-Charter was defeated 12 to 
3 votes. This means that even the permanent members of the UN-SC "did not have 
occasion to exercise a veto, since the numerical tally fell far short of passage." 124 
This is proof of the widespread international acceptance of the use of armed force on 
behalf of the protection of human rights at least when multilateral actions take place. 
This is underlined when the then Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, 
concluded on the second day of NATO operations in former Yugoslavia that he 
regrets that "diplomacy has failed but [that] there are times when the use of force 
may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace." 125 Even though he emphasised the prior 
responsibility of the UN-SC for the lawful use of armed force, 126 he acknowledged: 
127 
11 9 Wedgwood, above n 102,833 ; Chinkin, above n 102,843 . 
120 NA TO Press release ( 1999) 040, 24 March 1999 WW\\ .nato.in t docu pr I 999 p99-040e.htm 
(accessed 18 February 2008). 
121 Cassese, above n 8, 792; Schroeder, above n 43, 185; Jane Stromseth " Rethinking humanitarian 
intervention : the case for incremental change" in Holzgrefe and Keohane, above n 23, 232, 249. 
122 Wedgwood, above n I 02, 830-1. 
123 UN Doc S/1999/328, 26 March 1999, reprinted in UN Press release C 6659 
www. un .org ews Press docs 1999 19990326.sc6659.html (accessed 18 February2008). 
124 Wedgwood, above n I 02, 831. 
125 UN Doc SG/SM/6938 , 24 March 1999, Secretary-General's statement on NATO military action 
against Yugoslavia \\'WW.un.org e\, s Press docs 1999 sgsmxxxx.cloc.htm (accessedl8 February 
2008); quoted by Schroeder, above n 43, 186. 
126 Ibid . 
127 UN Press release SG/SM 7136, GA 9596 of20th of September 1999, ecretary General Presents 
His Annual Report to General Assembly 
\\\\ \\ .un.org ews Press docs 1999 l 9990920.sgsm7 I 36.htm l (accessed 18 February 2008). 
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The imperati ve of effectively halting gross ... human rights violations . .. [as an] 
equally compelling interest ... [and demands for the future] to forge unity behind the 
principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights - wherever they may 
take place - should not be allowed to stand . 
As a result , even if the multilateral use of force in the Kosovo conflict was not 
authorized by the UN-SC, it indicates there is a consistent state practice of 
humanitarian intervention. 
(d) European approach to humanitarian intervention 
Furthermore, the examination of the European approach to humanitarian 
intervention could give an important clue as to the existence of consistent state 
practice. On the 20 th of April 1994, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a 
resolution on humanitarian interventions. 128 The EP consists of representatives from 
all member states of the European Union (EU) who have been chosen as members of 
parliament by the European population in a direct election. 129 Therefore the EP can 
be seen as "the" democratic institution of the EU and therefore the resolutions 
adopted by the EP can be regarded as reflecting the opinion of the majority of the 
European population. The representation of the opinion of 492 million 130 citizens of 
the EU is an important source for the determination that certain state practice exists. 
Within its 1994 resolution, the EP took into account that international law is 
importantly influenced by the practice of the states and stressed the opinion that the 
present international law does not contradict the acknowledgement of lawful 
humanitarian intervention. Although the EP accepts the prior responsibility of the 
UN-SC to coordinate the use of armed force, it expresses the opinion that 
interventions for the protection of human rights also have to be possible without 
authorization by the UN-SC if no other course of action is possible. Finally, the EP 
demands that the European Commission and the Council of the European Union, 
who are two main organs of the EU, take a positive attitude on behalf of the 
acknowledgement ofa right to humanitarian intervention. 131 This positive attitude of 
the member states of the EU to the acknowledgement of a right to humanitarian 
128 Official Journal of the European Communities, C-Seri es 128, 09.05.1994, pages 225-227; reprinted 
in the German language in the officia l documents of the Gemrnn Parliament, BT-Drucksache 12/75 13 
["BT-Drucksache 12/75 13"]. 
129 Jo Steiner, Loma Woods and Christian Twigg-Flesner Textbook on EC Law (8 ed , Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2003) 20. 
130 www.europarl.europa.eu parliament public.do'/Janguage en (accessed 18 February 2008). 
131 " BT-Drucksache 12/75 13", above n 128, para 15 . 
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intervention acts as a further indicator for consistent state practice of human rights 
protection using the instrument of armed force. 
The European point of view on the legality of the use of force i also 
underlined in the legal disputes around the Kosovo crisis and especially in the ICJ 
case of Yugoslavia v Belgium. 132 In this case, Belgium argued in a preliminary 
hearing before the Court that the bombing in Kosovo was "a case of a lawful armed 
humanitarian intervention for which there is a compelling necessity." 133 Referring to 
this, O'Connell observes that "this argument is an example of state practice that 
helps to build a customary right." 134 
( e) Interim result 
The examination of the UN and respectively A TO lead interventions for 
humanitarian reasons which took place in the I 990s plus the European attitude on the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention leads to the conclusion that a consistent state 
practice for the use of armed forces on behalf of the protection of human rights exists 
at least for multilateral interventions. This result cannot be adopted off-hand for 
unilateral interventions as the question of their legitimacy is still the subject of 
intense academic disputes. 135 
2 Duration of state practice 
Beside consistency of state practice, the duration of state practice might be a 
second element of an emerging customary international law. The idea of 
humanitarian intervention being elevated to the level of customary international law 
especially arose after the unauthorized ATO bombardments in former Yugoslavia 
only 9 years ago. This suggests that for state practice to become customary 
international law a certain period may be required and 9 years in the case of 
Yugoslavia might not be enough. In the same way, the unilateral interventions which 
occurred in the 1970s can not serve as undisputed evidence for the existence of a 
consistent state practice of humanitarian intervention while the multilateral 
132 Case Concerning legality of Use of Force (Yugoslaria 1· Belgium) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 
[1999] ICJ Rep 124, documents available under \\W\\.icj-
c ij .org docket index.php'?p I 3&p2 3&code ybc&case I 05&k d6 (accessed 18 February 2008). 
m www.icj-cij.org docket files 105 4515.pdr(accessed 18 February 2008). 
114 Mary Ellen O'Connell "Re-Elashing the Dogs of War" (2003) 97 Am J lnt'l L 446, 448, there 
within footnote 10 ["Re-Elashing the Dogs of War"] . 
135 Among others compare Teson, above n 3, 2 I 9-78; Murphy, above n 9, 97-107; but see Merria, 
above n 5, 126, who also regards the uni lateral intervention of the 1970s as proof for the existence of a 
customary right to hw11anitarian intervention. 
26 
interventions of the 1990s pass this demand. This raises the question of whether the 
period of only 20 years of practised multilateral humanitarian interventions is long 
enough to create a binding rule of customary international law. 
However, "a long ... [or] immemorial practice is not necessary ... [and] the 
International Court does not emphasize the time element as such in its practice." 136 
The ICJ says in the Continental She(( case that "the passage of only a short period of 
time is not necessarily ... a bar to the formation of a new role of customary 
international law." 137 Therefore, we can conclude that even a relatively short period 
of 20 years of state practice is sufficient to become a rule of customary international 
law. Even if one regards humanitarian interventions to be state custom only since the 
Kosovo conflict, this is not a bar for its acknowledgement as customary international 
law. However, the other elements of customary international law need to be fulfilled. 
3 Opinio Juris et necessitates 
The second essential requirement of the emergence of customary international 
law is "opinio juris et necessitates" as the subjective element of customary 
international law. Opinio juris can be defined as the state's "belief in a legal 
obligation." 138 It was "introduced as a legal formula in an attempt to distinguish legal 
rules from mere social usage." 139 Therefore, the ICJ stated in the Continental Shelf 
case that: 140 
Not only must the acts concerned amow1t to a settled practice, but they must also be 
such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence ofa belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule requiring it. The need for such a belief 
... is implicit in the very notion of opinio juris sive necessitates. The States concerned 
must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. 
Although the ICJ demands opinio juris, it did not explain how this element of 
customary international law "can be established in practice." 141 In law, the 
136 "Principles of Public International Law", above n 104, 7; see also Rebecca MM Wallace, above n 
21, 1 O; Laursen , above n 108, 35-6. 
117 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany,, Netherlands) (Continental She([ case) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [ 1969] ICJ Rep 3, 
44 para 74 Judgment of the majority. 
1.is Mary Ellen O'Connell "Taking Opinio Juris Seriously" in Cannizzaro and Palchetti , above n I 03, 
14. 
139 Wallace, above n 21, 16. 
14° Continental She(/ case, above n 137, 45 para 77 Judgment of the majority. 141 Dixon, above n 18, 32. 
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determination of subjective elements typically causes more evidential problems than 
the determination of objective ones. So, "some controversy prevails among 
international lawyers regarding what types of evidence are appropriate for 
demonstrating [an opinio juris)." 142 There are basically two different academic 
approaches to finding a more defined description of what opinio iuris is. While some 
international lawyers, for example the dissenting judges in the Continental She(( 
case, are of the opinion "that opinio iuris can be presumed from the state practice, 
unless a contrary intention [is] apparent", 143 the other stream in literature does not 
accept this presumption but sees the opinio iuri element as "a distinct requirement 
[ of customary international law] which has to be independently and positively 
established." 144 As it is beyond the scope of this paper to find a solution for this 
academic dispute about the "right" approach to opinio juris, this work will be content 
with determining that consistent state practice of the use of armed force on behalf of 
the protection of human rights has to be regarded by the states as a legal obligation 
and not only as an act of "mere courtesy, convenience or tradition." 145 Evidence of 
such a state's opinio juris may "be found explicitly in some statements or implicitly 
in other statements, acts or 01nissions." 146 
(a) Belgium's approach 
Maybe the most obvious clue for a state regarding the use of armed forces on 
behalf of the protection of human rights as a legally binding task, can be found in 
Belgium's arguments for the justification of the intervention in Kosovo in which it 
took part as a member state of the NATO. "Throughout its argument Belgium 
acknowledges the developing nature of the idea of [a customary right to 
humanitarian intervention]." 147 In a hearing before the ICJ, Belgium's representative 
acknowledged the actions taken by the UN-SC under Chapter VII of the UN-Charter 
but at the same time demands the "need to go further and develop the idea of armed 
humanitarian intervention." 148 This indicate the Belgian understanding of 
humanitarian intervention to be not a mere moral act but a legally binding obligation. 
14 2 O'Connell, above n 134, 14. 
143 Dixon, above n 18, 32. 
144 Ibid, 32; see also "Principles of Public International Law", above n I 04, 8 
145 Wallace, above n 21 , 16. 
146 O'Connell, above n 134, 16. 
14 7 "Re-Elashing the Dogs of War", above n 134, 448 . 
148 
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In this respect, Belgian's counsel stated before the Court that "NATO ... felt obliged 
to intervene to forestall an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe." 149 
Moreover, the Belgian agent before the ICJ alternatively claimed to justify 
the use of armed force by means of necessity "if the court decided not to recognize [a 
customary right to humanitarian intervention]." 150 The fact that Belgium made this 
great effort to justify NA TO' s actions in Kosovo and therefore developed two 
different lines of legal arguments underlines Belgium's belief in an existing legal 
force behind the idea of use of armed force for humanitarian grounds. This too 
indicates an opinio iuris on humanitarian intervention being a legal obligation. 
Beside the use of legal arguments before the ICJ, Belgium's decision in the 
Atlantic Council to vote for the use of armed force in Kosovo infers that Belgium's 
government was convinced of a legal obligation to take action. As not only Belgium 
but also the 18 other member states of the NA TO voted for the armed humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo, this argument can be applied to the detern1ination of opinio 
juris of all these states. This leads to an analysis of the ATO's approach to 
humanitarian interventions. 
(b) NATO's approach 
ATO's understanding of humanitarian interventions as a legal obligation is 
underlined when the then Secretary-General of the NATO, Javier Solana, formulated 
in a press statement in the context of the Kosovo conflict as an obligation of the 
NA TO allies that they "must halt the vio Jenee and bring an end to the humanitarian 
catastrophe ... unfolding in Kosovo." 151 Moreover, even though the United State of 
America did not refer to military actions in Kosovo as a humanitarian intervention, a 
statement made by the United State's representative before the UN-SC indicates that 
human rights issues were an important part of the United States government's 
decision to take action. He stated that the United States and its allies believe that 
"action by ATO [in Kosovo] is justified and necessary to ... prevent ... [a] 
humanitarian disaster. " 152 The legal terms of "necessity" and "justification" therefore 
express an opinio iuris which underlines that A TO members understand 
149 Ibid. 
150w,, ,, .ic j-cij .org docket files I 05 4515.pdf (accessed 18 February 2008); quoted in "Re-Elashing the 
Dogs of War", above n 134,448. 
151 NATO Press release 1999 (040), 23 March 1999 W\\w.nato.int docu pr 1999 p99-040e.htm 
(accessed 18 February 2008). 
152 Security Council, 3988 th Meeting. UN Doc /PY 3988. 24 March 1999, reprinted in Harris, above 
n 112. 953. 
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humanitarian interventions to be an act of law rather than a mere moral or political 
act. 
In this context, also the debates within the German parliament that dealt with 
the participation of German armed forces in ATO lead operations in Kosovo have 
to be taken into account. Simma reports that these debates were full ofrespect for the 
provisions of the UN-Charter, but nevertheless the German government argued that 
the despite situation in Kosovo left no other choice than intervening by use of armed 
force. 153 "In this regard, differently from the NATO Secretary-General, the [German] 
government called the spade a spade and spoke of the ATO threat as an instance of 
'humanitarian intervention'." 154 Even though the German government regarded "the 
Kosovo case as exceptional," 155 this is a proof for the German opinio juris that in 
certain situations the use of armed force on humanitarian grounds can be justified 
and seen as a legally binding task. 
(c) United Kingdom's approach 
Another clue for the acceptance of humanitarian intervention being 
customary international law can be found in the United Kingdom. Even though the 
United Kingdom's Attorney General Lord Goldsmith expres es doubts about a 
justification on humanitarian grounds for recent military actions in Iraq, 156 the 
United Kingdom's government has made great efforts to establish an opinio juris 
and therefore a positive attitude towards a right to humanitarian intervention. For 
example, the United Kingdom Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention, 157 which 
were produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and list strict rules for the use of 
armed force on behalf of the protection of human rights, prove the United 
Kingdom's belief in humanitarian intervention to be an act of law and not a mere 
moral obligation. 
In 1991 France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom 
initiated no-fly zones in Northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish minority. These actions 
153 Bruno imma" ATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" (1999) 10 EJIL I, 12. 
154 Ibid, 12-3. 
155 Harris, above n 112,958; see also Simrna, above n 153, 13; Byers and Chesterman, above 11 103, 
199; Robert Uerpmann "La primaute des droits de l'homme: liceite OU illiceite de ('intervention 
hwnanitaire" in Christian Tomuschat (ed) Koso1'0 and the International Community (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2002) 72; compare Chinkin, above n I 02, 844. 
156 Report of Attorney General about military action in lraq (7 March 2003) page 2 No 4 , 
,vww.pm.gO\ .uk files pelf lrag 0 o20 Rcsolution° 0201441.pdf'(accessed 18 February 2008); see also 
"The Use of Force and the International Legal Order", above n 42, 597. 
157 United Kingdom Guidelines on llumanitarian Intervention, reprinted in Harris, above n 112, 957-8 
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were not covered by the UN-SC resolution 688 158 and therefore the House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee questioned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Within this questioning the counsellor of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs conceded 
that the actions in Iraq were "not specifically mandated by the United ations." 159 
However, within the same sentence he justified the actions as having been taken "in 
exercise of the customary international law principle of humanitarian 
intervention." 160 
This stresses the UK's opinio juris that humanitarian interventions are not a 
mere social act but an act of law: 161 
The UK more than any other State has developed a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention as an autonomous institution ... [by arguing] that the interpretation of 
Article 2 (4) UN-Charter has changed over time [and] that international law in this 
field has developed to meet new situations. 
(d) European approach 
In addition to the opinio iuris of single European states, the 1994 resolution 
on the right of humanitarian intervention adopted by the EP serves as proof of the 
acceptance of humanitarian intervention as an act of law. The EP developed several 
criteria which have to be taken into account to legalize the use of armed force on 
behalf of the protection of human rights. 162 The fonnulation of uch trict elements 
as a requirement for certain actions indicates the understanding of humanitarian 
intervention to be a legal tool and not a mere social one. Moreover, since the 
amendments of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the Treaty on European Union (EUT) 
came into force on the 1 ;t of May 1999, Article 17 EUT stipulates that among the 
tasks of the EU there are also "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks 
and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." The 
spectrum of possible actions under Article 17 EUT contains the possibility to run 
combat missions. 163 The deci ion of the EU member states to admit these provisions 
158 Rebecca MM Wallace, above n 21,287; llarris, above n 112,950. 
159 Parliamentary Papers, 1992-1993, HC, Paper 235-iii, 85, 92, reprinted in Harris, above n 112, 950. 160 Ibid. 
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ed, Verlag CH Beck, Miinchen , 2007) Article 17 EUV, para 25 "Die ' Petersberg-Aufgaben "' 
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m the basic European document also implies the acceptance of the use of armed 
force on behalf of the protection of human rights and serves as a proof for an opinio 
JUrIS. 
4 Interim Result 
So far, the analysis of the elements of customary international law leads to the 
interim result that a new customary law of humanitarian intervention has emerged. 
Nevertheless, there are states which do not accept the right of multilateral alliances 
to intervene in the territory of a sovereign state without authorization by the UN-SC. 
For example, the Ministerial Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
Group of 77, 164 which was adopted in New York three months after the ATO 
bombing against Yugoslavia ended, "rejected the so-called right of humanitarian 
intervention ... [because it Jacks a] basis in the UN-Charter or international law." 165 
The resistance of several states to the acknowledgment of a right to 
humanitarian intervention raises two questions. First - requires the emergence of a 
new customary law the unity of all states in the world's community? And econdly -
can a rule of customary international law be "only binding upon States of a certain 
geographical area or region" 166 respectively of a certain alliance and therefore have 
an effect only on local law in the international context? 
5 Requires a new custom the unity of all states? 
The approach of assuming that the unity of all states is required for the birth 
of a new custom "is no longer tenable today .... Customary rules do not need to be 
supported or consented by all States." 167 The ulterior motive of this statement 
becomes clear when the development of the world community in the post-World 
War II period is taken into account. Within this period, the number of UN member 
states grew from 51 in 1945 up to 19 l in 2005. 168 "With the new actors ... has come 
164 Ministerial Declaration, 23 rd Annual Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Group of 
77, 24 September 1999 [" Ministerial Declaration G 77"] WW\\.g77.org doc Decll999.htm l (accessed 
18 February 2008). 
165 Ibid , para 67, see also "Principles of Public International Law", above n 104, 712; Kolb, above n 
27, 126, there footnote 30; Byers and Chesterman, above n I 03, 184, there footnote 25. 166 "Internationa1Law",aboven 103 , 163 . 
167 Ibid 162. 
168 "UN High-level Panel" , above n I, para 2; see also Gareth vans and Mohamed Sahnoun The Responsibility to Protect (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 200 I) 3 para 1.13 
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a wide range of new voices, perspectives, interests, experiences and aspirations" 169 
which creates challenges "within the field of human rights." 170 Therefore, it is almost 
impossible to unite the opinions of all states of the world community with their wide 
range of varying interests. The claim for complete unity of all tates as a requirement 
for a new custom would make new customary international law impossible to come 
into being. 
6 The right to humanitarian intervention as local custom 
This paper shows con istent state practice and opinio juris mainly by the 
example of the Kosovo crisis where ATO member states justified their actions as 
humanitarian intervention. These actions in Kosovo have "produced a fundamental 
split between NATO States on the one hand and China, Russia and the on-Aligned 
Movement on the other. " 171 For example, the 1999 Ministerial Declaration adopted 
by the Group of 77 Foreign Ministers 172 stresses the refusal of a right to 
humanitarian intervention by African, Asian, Latin-American and Arab States.173 
However, the argument delivered by critics of a customary right to 
humanitarian intervention, that the refusal of such a right by the on-Aligned states 
prevents the emergence of a custom of humanitarian intervention at all , 174 is not 
necessarily convincing. Rather the split between acceptance and refusal of 
humanitarian intervention could mean that the right to humanitarian intervention 
exists not as a universal but as a local custom. 
The ICJ dealt with the question of whether non-universal but local rules of 
customary international law do exist in its judgment on the Asylum case. ln thi case, 
"the Columbian government .. . has relied on ... regional or local custom peculiar to 
Latin American States." 175 Although Columbia failed to prove the existence of a 
local custom, 176 the "ICJ has admitted . .. that such rule may exist. " 177 In the Case 
Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory the Court said that "it is difficult 
169 Ibid . 
170 Rebecca MM Wallace, above n 2 1, 5. 
171 "The Use o f Force and the International Legal Order", above n 42,594. 
172 "Mini sterial Declaration G 77", above n 164. 
173 "Principl e of Public International Law", above n 104, 712. 
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to see why the number of States between which a local custom may be established ... 
must necessarily be larger than two." 178 The acceptance of customary international 
law existing only between two countries underlines that local customary 
international law in general has to be acknowledged. 179 
The acknowledgment of local customary international law leads to a further 
question - does such local custom only apply within the confines of that locality? 
For example, does the existence of a local custom of humanitarian intervention in the 
NATO member states mean an entitlement to take action only within the alliance, or 
could it legalize the use of force against China, Russia or India who explicitly 
rejected the existence of a right to humanitarian intervention? Iflocal customary law 
only applies in the relevant locality, NATO's actions in Kosovo might have been 
illegal because former Yugoslavia was a non allied state and therefore not bound on 
intra alliance customs. 180 
This approach, to apply rules of local custom restrictively and only within a 
geographical region or between members of a certain alliance, is underlined by the 
argument that local customary law "is of a more contractual nature than a general 
[custom]." 181 This contractual character of local custom requires the consent of all 
parties between whom the local rule of customary international law is to be applied, 
while an application of this custom to a third party remains illegal. 182 On the 
contrary, in certain circumstances human rights go beyond local custom and have to 
be seen in a more universal perspective. 183 The value of human rights and its 
international dimension could outweigh mere local interests. 184 Therefore, a 
restrictive understanding of rules of local custom could restrict the justifiability of 
the use of armed force on humanitarian grounds too much. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to give an exhaustive analysis 
of the application of rules of local customary law. Because of the complexity of 
178 Case Concerning Right of Passage Ol'er Indian Territo,y (Portugal v India) (Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility) [1960] ICJ Rep 6, 39 Judgment of the majority. 
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custom" instead of"regional" or " local" custom. 
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182 Ibid , see also Shaw, above n 21, 87-8; "Custom as a Source of International Law", above n 179, 
29. 
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humanitarian interventions, the question of whether a local application is sufficient 
to protect human rights or a wider perspective is needed, remains a case by case 
decision and can not be confined within a general clause. 
B Interim Result 
As an interim re ult , we can state that the multilateral use of armed force 
when human rights are infringed fulfils the elements which are required for evolving 
customary international law. Even though this result is doubted by some authors, 
who refer to the rejecting opinion of for example Russia and India, 185 the 
acknowledgement of local rules of customary international law underlines the 
emergence of a custom of humanitarian intervention at least in the "western" world. 
Consistent state practice of multilateral humanitarian interventions especially since 
the 1990s and opinio iuris of the states contributes to the "willingness [of the 
international community] to use humanitarian concerns as a basis for intervention 
into what are essentially civil-war conflicts." 186 
This result can be underlined by a systematic argument. The 
acknowledgement of at least a local customary right to humanitarian intervention 
does not mean a breach in the system of exceptions to the principles of prohibition of 
the use of armed force and non-intervention. As already indicated, the right to self-
defence, which is undoubtedly an exception to A1iicle 2 (4) and (7) of the UN-
Charter, has its source in treaty law as well as in customary international law. This 
means, exceptions to the prohibition of the use of armed force and the principle of 
non-intervention that are not explicitly listed in the UN-Charter already exist. The 
acceptance of a customary right to humanitarian intervention is nothing but a further 
unwritten exception to these basic rules of international law and is in accord with the 
rule-exception system in the law on the use of armed force. As the Netherlands stated 
before the UN-SC, "the Charter is not the only source of international law" 187 which 
implies "that general norms may exist .. . [even also] outside the UN-Charter." 188 
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However, the acceptance of a custom of humanitarian intervention creates a 
potential conflict between customary international law and international treaty law. 
This conflict erupts when the multilateral use of armed force is not explicitly 
authorized by the UN-SC in the meaning of Chapter VII of the UN-Charter as, for 
example, in orthem Iraq in I 991 or in the Kosovo crisis in 1999. This raises the 
question of the relationship between the UN-Charter on the one hand and the 
customary rules of humanitarian intervention on the other. 
C Relationship of UN-Charter and Customary Law of Humanitarian 
Intervention 
First of all, "there is no genera lly established hierarchy between treaty and 
custom, because they both emanate from States and are equivalent expressions of 
their consent to be bound intemationally." 189 However, the relationship of treaty and 
customary law, where the customary law is later in time than the treaty, i not 
undisputed. 
On the one hand , the lex posterior rule, which means that the later law 
prevails over the earlier law, 190 could lead to the conclusion that the customary 
acceptance of humanitarian intervention has precedence over the UN-Charter just 
because it is the newer law. On the other hand , such an understanding of the 
relationship in the case of a conflict of treaty and customary law "cuts against the 
certainty and vitality of obligations freely and deliberately undertaken in a treaty." 191 
An approach of simply applying the lex posterior rule doe not sufficiently take into 
account that the regulations of the UN-Charter are of a special character that makes 
Charter law stand out against "nonnal" treaty law. 192 The pecial status of the UN-
Chaiier becomes obvious when Article 103 UN-Charter is taken into account. This 
stipulates that in a conflict with other international agreements the Charter 
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obligations shall prevail. Moreover, the character of the prohibition of the aggressive 
use of armed force as being a jus cogens rule 193 has to be considered and might 
preclude a simple application of the Jex posterior rule. Thus, taking the special 
character of the UN-Charter provisions about the use of armed force into account, it 
is a better solution to accept the international treaty as still "govern[ing] between the 
parties even though a new practice has developed [in a different direction]." 194 This 
appears to be more convincing than simply applying the lex posterior rule. 
As a result, treaty law and customary international law exist in parallel and it 
can be suggested that "the ICJ will attempt to interpret the treaty as complementary 
to the new custom as far as possible." 195 
VII REQUIREMENTS FOR LAWFUL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS 
The acknowledgement of humanitarian interventions as a rule of at least local 
customary international law, which exists side by side with the treaty law of the UN-
Charter, leads to the further question of which requirements are necessary to justify 
the use of armed force against a sovereign state on a foreign territory. Even though 
rules of customary international law are advantageous because of their flexibility, 
"along with this flexibility comes a certain amount of uncertainty." 196 The danger of 
legal uncertainty makes it necessary to clarify single elements for the justification of 
humanitarian interventions. The need for a development of rules in context with 
human rights violations is underlined by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan when he demands that ''the United ations and its Member States must 
strengthen the [international] nonnative framework" 197 and by help of that "move 
towards embracing and acting on the 'responsibility to protect' potential or actual 
victims of massive atrocities." 198 
This paper has shown that the UN-Charter accepts the use of armed force 
only in extraordinary situations. This gives rise to the sharp contrast between the 
written treaty law and the justification of the use of armed force in customary 
international law. Just as there are strict treaty requirements in the UN-Charter for 
193 Hannikainen, above n 58, 356 and 717 ; Shaw, above n 21 , I O 18. 
194 Dixon, above n 18, 36. 
195 Ibid, 37; Laursen, above n 108, 99. 
196 Dixon, above n 18 , 28. 
197 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Iluman Rights for All: Report of the 
Secretary-General" (21 March 2005) N59/2005, para 131 ["In Larger Freedom"] 
www.un .org largerrreedom (accessed 18 February 2008); see also "UN High-level Panel", above n I, 
para 89. 
198 "In Larger Freedom", above n 197, para 132. 
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the use of armed force, so too , should humanitarian interventions as customary 
international law demand stringent rules to make them a lawful act. 199 Moreover, the 
danger of abusing human rights as an excuse for the use of armed force gives rise to 
the need for strict elements and a wide limitation of humanitarian interventions. 
Those voices in the literature that criticise the acknowledgement of a right to 
humanitarian intervention argue that "once established such a right would be difficult 
to check . . . and therefore raises serious difficulties despite its noble objectives. "200 
The danger of an improper use of the right to humanitarian intervention is contained 
when stringent rules are set and also kept. 201 
In international literature, there exist several documents and various different 
approaches which list different elements as requirements for legal humanitarian 
intervention. This emphasises an "increasing international interest m the 
development of a detailed framework for humanitarian intervention [where] some 
even suggest that there should be a duty to intervene. "202 For example, the EP 
formulated certain rules when it acknowledges the right to humanitarian intervention 
without authorization by the UN-SC but at the same time asks for a strict and 
objective measure to justify the use of armed force. 203 Other examples are the United 
Kingdom Guidelines on Humanitarian lntervention204 or the Canadian Principles for 
Military lntervention.205 Wallace reinforces this demand for strict rules when she 
states that "what is required are accepted principles setting out the circumstances in 
which such international intervention would be lawful." 206 
In the following part, this paper tries to point out which elements are usefu l 
measures to define whether the use of armed force in a certain situation was a lawful 
act. This examination is based on the fact that the use of armed force is not the rule 
but only is lawful in extraordinary situations. 207 Therefore, a careful analysis of the 
different approaches in international literature is given. 
199 "Ex inuria oritur", above n 50, 27; Cassese, above n 8, 798; Jennings and Ward, above n 16, 439; 
see also von Schorlemer, above n 75, 47 who asks for an enabling statute fo r humanitarian 
interventions that grants objectivity and legal certainty. 20° Charney, above n 113, 837; see also Dixon, above n 18, 305. 201 Merria , above n 5, 126. 
202 "1l1e Use of Force and the International Legal Order", above n 42, 596; see also Vukas, above n 3, 
238 who pleads for a "duty to intervene". 
203 "BT- Drucksache 12/7 513", above n 128, para 12. 
204 "UK Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention", above n 157, 957-8. 205 " Responsibi lity to Protect", above n 168, XII, Synopsis. 
206 Rebecca MM Wallace, above n 2 1,289. 
207 See " Responsibility to Protect", above n 168, X II , Principles for Military Intervention ( I) . 
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A Convincing Evidence of Massive Human Rights Violations 
The first element for the justification of armed interventions on humanitarian 
grounds is convincing evidence of massive human rights violations. When the United 
Kingdom's government set out the United Kingdom Guidelines on Humanitarian 
Intervention, it concluded that there "must be convincing evidence of extreme 
humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring urgent relief "208 The importance of 
convincing evidence becomes obvious when the representatives of NATO members 
referred to UN body reports of gross human rights violations in Kosovo, before 
coming to the legal justification of the use of armed force itself For example, in the 
preliminary objections held by Germany in the Case Concerning Legality of Use of 
Force, 209 Germany referred to the various statements made by U bodies which 
serve as evidence for massive human rights violations caused by Yugoslavian public 
authorities. Therefore, convincing evidence of gross human rights violations i the 
background for every justification of the use of armed force on behalf of the 
protection of human rights. 
However, it is hard to measure at what point human rights violations are 
intense enough to justify military actions on the territory of a foreign country. 210 The 
examples of "the loss of life of hundreds or thousands of innocent people and ... 
crimes against humanity"211 as well as "large scale 'ethnic cleansing"'2 12 can only 
serve as possible clues. Beside that, the scale and number of breaches of international 
obligations, which can either be part of treaty or be part of customary international 
law, weigh into the determination of whether a humanitarian intervention is 
justifiable. The definition of humanitarian intervention, which is used as the basis of 
this paper, demands "widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human 
rights."213 Therefore, human rights which are evidentially violated must have an 
international dimension and find support in the international community. This, at 
least, applies to the breach of jus cogens norms which prohibit "gross offences 
against the life, integrity and dignity of human beings ... [such as, for example,] 
208 "UK Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention", above n 157. 958; see also Charney. above n 113, 838; "UN High-level Panel", above n I, para 207 (a); Stromseth. above n I 21, 248; Benjamin. above n 47, 152. 
209 See Case Concerning Legality of Use qf Force (Yugosfal'ia ,, Cer111an_1~. Preliminary Objections. for example paras 2. 7, 2.2 I. 2.26. 2.35 \\'\\ w.icj-ci j.orn docket files I 08 I 0875.pdf (accessed 18 February 2008). 
210 See Reisman, above n 62. 86 I. 
211 "Ex inuria ius oritur". above n 50. 27. 
2 12 " Responsibility to Protect", above n 168. XII. Synopsis; see also Tan . above n 184. 89. 213 See above II. page 6. 
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genocide; ... severe fom1s of collective punishment; torture ... or mass extennination, 
arbitrary killings and summary executions. "214 
The international dimension of human rights or the scale of breaches of 
international obligations are no more than a clue for the justification of the use of 
armed force. The final determination of whether a humanitarian intervention is 
lawful because of proved massive human rights violations going on in the particular 
country, remains a case by case decision. At least, it is clear that for the ju tification 
of the use of armed force on a foreign territory the mere initial idea of human rights 
violations possibly taking place is not enough. The infringement of a sovereign 
territory demands convincing evidence that human rights violation of an 
international dimension are going on. 
B Priority of Conflict Prevention 
The first argument which is set out m the United Kingdom Guidelines on 
Humanitarian Intervention proceeds from the assumption that "any [armed] 
intervention ... is an admission of failure of prevention."2 15 The United Kingdom's 
government demands "a strengthened culture of conflict prevention ... [and, for 
example,] to stop the trade in ... arms ... and diamonds,"2 16 which often causes and 
escalates conflicts and therefore increases the threat to human rights of the civil 
population. In respect thereof, "prevention options should always be exhausted 
before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be 
devoted to it. "21 7 
The idea of supremacy of conflict prevention might indicate that this element 
is fulfilled as long as prior to the use of armed force every effort has been made to 
avoid the conflict and therefore the use of armed force only serves as a last resort. 
However, the requirement of conflict prevention contains an ongoing time element 
and is not just fulfilled at that point of time where certain actions were taken prior to 
the use of armed fo rce: 21 8 
2 14 Hannikainen , above n 58, 717-18 . 
2 15 "UK Guidelines on Humanitarian I.ntervention", above n 157. 957 . 216 Ibid; see also "UN High-level Panel", above n I, para 95-6; Urquart. above 11 I, 96-7 who writes 
about arms control. 
2 17 "Responsibility to Protect", above n 168, XI, Core Principle (4) A; see also Benjamin, above n 47, 
153. 
218 Michael Ignatieff"State failure and nation-building" in Holzgrefe and Keohane, above 11 23, 299, 
320. 
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[A] respon sibility to prevent [also indicates] a responsibility to follow through . 
Action ... of a coercive kind lacks legitimacy unless every effort has been made to 
avert the catastrophe; once action is taken. its legitimacy depends on staying the 
course until the situation is on the mend . [A legitimate intervention] begins with 
prevention and ends with sustained follow-up. 
Taking a limited time view that concentrates only on pure prevention and not 
considering ongoing support, is dangerous. Ethnic conflicts, which are a main reason 
for the use of armed force in contemporary human rights law, are of such a nature 
"that the perpetrators of atrocities will simply retreat . . . and await future 
opportunities to resume hostilities."219 For example, the ethnic melting pot Kosovo 
still needs the presence of international peacekeeping forces even though almost 9 
years have passed since A TO started their actions in that area. Thus, "political as 
well as economic reconstruction will be sorely needed for years to come. "220 The 
protection of human rights of the Albanian population in Kosovo would not have 
been effective if NATO had simply stopped their actions after bombing out the 
Serbian forces. 
In respect thereof, the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, acknowledged 
the responsibility of the ATO members "to reconstruct the Balkan [ and tressed 
that] the promises that [were] made during the course of the conflict [have to be] 
honoured post-conflict."22 1 The existence of a plan that outlines reconstruction and 
withdrawal in the intervened countr/22 is important to determine whether a 
justifiable humanitarian intervention took place. However, the planning for a 
humanitarian intervention must always have a certain degree of flexibility. Thi 
contributes to the complexity of humanitarian interventions in international relations. 
We can conclude that not mere conflict prevention is sufficient to justify 
humanitarian interventions but also a minimum future strategy to prevent further 
human rights violations is needed. 223 As Kofi Annan stated , "the aftermath of war 
2 19 Stromseth . aboven 121 . 269 . 
220 Bartam S Brown " Humanitarian Intervention at a Cro,sroads" (1999-2000) 41 Wm & Mary L Rev. 
1737-8. 
22 1 Ibid . 173 7. there reprinted with in footnote n 204; see also " Respons ibility to Protect", above n 168. XI. Core Principles (3) C; Terry ardi11 " Introduction" in ardin and Williams. above 11 2 I. 20. 222 See Charney. above 11 113. 839. 
223 Stromseth . above 11 121 . 269; compare Michael W Doyle and icholas Sam ban is Making War and Building Peace (Princeton University Press, Princeton. 2006) I 0- I. who li st the e lements of 
"preventive diplomacy'' and "post conflict reconstruction". 
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requires no less skill, no less sacrifice, no fewer resow-ces than the war itself, if 
lasting peace is to be secured. "224 
C Priority of Self-Help 
Another element for the justification of humanitarian intervention might be 
the priority of self-help. This element contributes to the fact that the elimination of 
internal human rights violations is subject to the main responsibility of the state's 
own government. It is part of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state that it 
"has power and authority over all persons, property and events occurring within its 
territory"225 which also includes the protection of human rights. Therefore, "the 
immediate responsibility for halting violence rests with the state in which it 
occurs. "226 
However, the priority of the self-help element is a very limited one. 22 7 
Obviously, it must be restricted to cases in which the sovereign state in question has 
the necessary power to stop the human rights violations. Moreover, this element can 
not be applied where the sovereign state itself causes and increases humanitarian 
disasters. In cases: 228 
Where a population is suffering serious ham, , [for example,] as a result ... of state 
failure, and the state . .. is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle ofnon-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect [human rights) . 
This leads us to the conclusion that the priority of self-help is a restricted 
element for the justification of humanitarian interventions. Cases of interventions in 
which human rights violations are not caused by the state's own government 
respectively where the government has the power to put a top to those violations, 
remain an exception. 
D Legitimate Actor 
The justification of the use of armed force to protect human rights raises the 
question of who is a legitimate actor to stop ma sive human rights violations. 
22 4 Brown, above n 220, 1738, tJ1ere reprinted within footnote n 207. 225 Dixon, above n 18 , 135; see also Jennings and Ward, above n 16, 442 . 226 "UK Guidelines on Humanitarian intervention". above n 157, 957; Stromseth. above n 121, 270. 227 Compare "UN High-level Panel". above n I. paras 24-28. where more general "The limits of self 
protection" are described. 
228 "Responsibility to Protect", above n 168. XI Core Principles (I) B. 
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According to Murphy's definition of humanitarian intervention, possible actions to 
protect fundamental rights might be taken by the UN as an international organization, 
by other alliances of states or by a single state. 229 In this context, the prior 
competence of the UN-SC as a legitimate actor on behalf of the protection of human 
rights requires discussion. 
1 Prior competence of the UN-SC 
The prior competence of the UN-SC to authorize the use of armed force is a 
result of the provisions of Chapter VII ofthe UN-Charter. For example, Article 51 of 
the Charter grants the right to self-defence, but limits this right when it says that self-
defence is only appropriate "until the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security." Moreover, Article 51 of the 
UN-Charter stipulates that the right to self defence "shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council .... " Articles 41 and 42 of the 
Charter regulate possible reactions of the UN against threats to peace and that these 
reactions require authorization by the UN-SC. In respect of these competences of the 
UN-SC and the system regulated in Chapter VII of the Charter, the Canadian report 
on the Responsibility to Protect outlines that "there is no better or more appropriate 
body than the United ations Security Council to authorize military intervention for 
human protection purposes."230 Moreover, the EP considers the competence of the 
UN-SC and acknowledges humanitarian interventions without its authorization only 
in a situation, where the UN bodies are not able to react effectively and in due 
time. 231 Most important examples of the inability of the UN-SC to prevent gro s 
human rights violations are disagreements among the -SC members or the 
· f 232 exercise o veto powers. 
The requirement of prior consultation of the U -SC contributes to legal 
certainty. As already said above, a great advantage of international treaty law i the 
certainty of the letter of the law. 233 As treaties are in general "the result of a 
conscious and deliberate act [and therefore] are more likely to be respected,"234 also 
the UN-Charter expresses a legal framework which is likely to be accepted all over 
229 See above II, page 6. 
m "Responsibility to Protect", above n 168, XI, Principles for Military Intervention (3) A. rn "BT-Drucksache 12/7513", above n 128, para 10 letter b): see also Stromseth, above n 121 , 248 . 212 "Ex inuria ius oritur", above n 50, 27, see also Wedgwood, above n 102, 834 . m Dixon, above n 18, 28 . 
234 Ibid , 25: see also Rebecca M M Wallace, above n 21 , 20. 
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the world. With regard to this, the provisions of the Charter and especially of its 
Chapter VII have to be kept wherever this is possible. This is accepted by the United 
Kingdom's government even though they took part on the unauthorized ATO 
actions in Kosovo. The United Kingdom Guidelines on Humanitarian intervention 
state that "our own preference would be that , wherever possible, the authority of the 
Security Council should be secured."235 
2 Subordinated competence of other multilateral alliances 
This statement indicates the subordinated competence of other multilateral 
alliances, such as NATO or the African Union, to take action when gross human 
rights violations occur. The decision taking process in such multilateral alliances is 
organized in a democratic way and takes the varying opinions of several states into 
consideration. "The intervenors [have] to justify their action not only to their 
domestic publics but also . .. to the larger international community."236 This means 
that actions lead by state alliances can rely on a broad international acceptance. This 
international acceptance is very important for the credibility of human rights policies 
and the protection of human rights in general. For example, the insight into the need 
for international acceptance has served as justification of the A TO bombardments 
in Kosovo: 237 
NA TO can claim the legitimacy of a nineteen-nation decision process, and the 
nom1ative commitments of a democratic Europe .... [Moreover,] ATO includes the 
vast majority of countries in Europe [and tl1erefore] NATO 's deci sion deserves greater 
defence than purely unilateral action . 
3 Unla1't_fulness of unilateral interventions 
This already seems to indicate the unlawfulness of unilateral intervention , 
especially what is outlined by the United Kingdom Guidelines on Humanitarian 
Intervention where it says that "no individual country can reserve to itself the right to 
act on behalf of the international community."238 However, one might claim that the 
refusal of unilateral interventions is not convincing in cases where a former colonial 
rn "UK Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention", above n 157, 958 . 236 Stromseth, above n 121 , 251 . 
m Wedgwood, above n 102, 833 ; quoted by Schroeder, above n 43 . 185 : see al so "Ex inuria ius oritur", above n 50. 28 : Chinkin. above n 102, 843 . 218 "UK Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention", above n 157, 958; Rebecca MM Wallace, above n 21 , 289; see also chroeder. above n 43, 186: Bouchet-Saulnier, above n 28, 23 I. 
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power decides to take action in a country which was under its administration for a 
longer period of time. 239 The ongoing responsibility for former colonies might justify 
military actions to protect the colony's population and therefore outweigh the 
criticism about unilateral humanitarian interventions. But this argument is not 
sufficient to take the danger of unilateral use of anned forces into con ideration. 
The illegality of unilateral interventions is based on two main arguments. 
First, the use of armed force only by a single actor can not rely on an international 
democratic decision-making process and therefore often lacks international 
acceptance. 240 The use of armed force by a big country to intervene in the policies of 
a less powerful state always has the danger of appearing arbitrary even if human 
rights are protected. This can give the impression that human rights are just an 
excuse to overthrow a foreign government. This already indicates the second 
argument against unilateral interventions which is that these contain the threat of 
misuse of armed force. 241 
Therefore, the counterarguments against unilateral interventions, the lack of 
international acceptance and the danger of abuse of military powers, must outweigh 
the responsibilities of former colonial powers with regard to their colonies. 
Additionally, events in Rwanda have shown that former colonial powers do not 
prioritise having a responsibility for the population of the former colony. ln Rwanda, 
the Belgian government decided to withdraw its troops because Hutus killed I 0 
Belgian soldiers in the beginning of the genocide. 242 This delivers a practical 
argument against the lawfulness of unilateral interventions even in cases where 
former colonial powers take military actions. 
4 interim result 
As a result , it has to be stated that multilateral humanitarian intervention 
generally have to be authorized by the UN-SC and unauthorized multilateral 
interventions lead by an alliance of states are only lawful if an authorization 
according to Chapter VII of the UN-Cha11er is not possible in due time. Mere 
unilateral interventions are illegal as ingle state , whether they are former colonial 
239 ee Tan, above n 184, 97. who lists as examples Britain's responsibilities in Sierra Leone. France's 
responsibilities in the Ivory Coast and Portugal 's responsibilities in East Timor. 240 Terry ardin "Introduction" in ardin and Williams. above n 21 . 18 . 241 See von chorlemer. above n 75, 43. 
242 lluman Rights Watch Sha tiered Li, ·es WW\\ .hrn .org report~ 1996 Rwanda.htm (accessed 18 
February 2008). 
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powers or not, are not legitimate actors in order to protect human rights by the use of 
armed force. 
E Respect for the Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty Rights of the 
Intervened State 
The territorial integrity and sovereignty of a tate is a basic principle of 
international law, embodied in Article 2 (7) of the UN-Charter. 243 However, the 
tetTitorial integrity and sovereignty of a state not only mean a right of the state to 
demand an acknowledgment of its national borders but also contains obligations. The 
principle of "state sovereignty implies ... the primary responsibility [of the 
government] for the protection of its people. "244 The respect for the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the state which is to be intervened reaches its limit when 
this state fails to fulfil its obligations in regards to the own population or even 
actively commits human rights violations. 245 "The defence of state sovereignty ... 
does not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its 
own people."246 
When the Belgian government justified its participation in the actions taken 
in Kosovo, it argued before the ICJ that "NATO has never questioned the political 
independence or territorial integrity of Yugoslavia."24 7 As an extreme, this could 
indicate the argument that a "true" humanitarian intervention, which solely aims on 
the protection of human rights, does not affect the sovereignty of the intervened 
state. However, this statement is obviously too general. If a multilateral alliance 
makes use of armed force to push through a different behaviour of the foreign state 
this means an invasion of sovereignty even if the force is used on behalf of the 
protection of human rights. 
The ascertainment of a correct balance between the tetTitorial integrity of an 
intervened state and the right of multilateral alliances to prevent gross human rights 
m See above VA 2, page 15. 
244 "Responsibility to Protect", above n 168, XI Core Principles (I) A: " UN High-level Panel", above 
n I, para 29. 
245 See "UN I Iigh-level Panel", above n I, para 200; Jennings and Ward. above n 16. 442 . 246 "Responsibility to Protect", above n 168. 8 para 1.35. 24 7 CR 1999/15, Public sitting held on Monday I 0 th May 1999, at 3 pm. at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry. Acting President. presiding \\ \\ \\ .ic j-c ij .org docket files I 05 45 15.pdf 
(accessed 18 February 2008). 
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violations has to take into account that the classical concept of state sovereignty has 
to face challenge in contemporary history: 248 
TI1e protection of human rights does not belong any more to the domain reserve of 
States. TI1is is particularly clear in States where there is no central Government, or the 
Government is engaged in a civil war. Many African States are today faced with such 
situations. 
There, conflicts are often caused by ethnical, ideological or religious reasons 
and seldom have a mere ten-itorial context. ot only in Africa but even in central 
Europe the international dimension of conflicts became obvious when ma sive 
human rights violations in Kosovo committed by Yugoslavian armed forces cau ed 
the flight ofrefugees over the borders to Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania and many other 
European Countries. 249 The NATO member states feared a destabilization of a whole 
region in central Europe and this served as an argument for the justification of the 
use of armed force. 250 
These examples plus today's high value of human rights251 stress that many 
conflicts of contemporary history have an international dimension which contradict 
the traditional concept of a state's unimpeachable sovereignty over the own 
ten-itory. 252 If massive human rights violations cause a cri is of international 
dimension, the concerned state can not insist on its tenitorial sovereignty when an 
intervention is necessary to re-establish international stability. In respect thereof:253 
The international legal system has radically changed since the founding of the United 
Nations, resulting in the development of a right of humanitarian intervention. At the 
time the Charter entered into force ... the independence of states ... was of foremost 
importance. New developments in international human rights law, particularly with 
regard to international crimes, authorize ... all states to take action in the face of 
widespread grave violations ofhwnan rights amounting to such crimes. 
24 Vukas, above n 3, 237; see also "UN High-level Panel", above n I, paras 17-23, where more general the international dimension of threats for the international community, for example, by diseases or terrorist attacks is described ; "lnternational Law", above n I 03 , 385-6, where an "extraterritorial scope" of human rights is described . 
249 "Ex inuria ius oritur", above n 50, 25; Wedgwood, above n 102,832. 250 Wedgwood, above n I 02, 832; see also A TO Press release ( 1999) 040, 24 March I 999 \\ \\ \\ .na to.in t/doc u pr 1999 p99-040e.htm (accessed 18 February 2008), where the then ecretary-General of ATO justifies the actions taken in Kosovo with the aim "to prevent instability spreading in the region". 
251 See above IV, page 12 ; see also Merria, above n 5. 115 and I 16. 252 Merria, above n 5, 117. 
251 Charney, above n 113,837. 
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This suggests that even if the use of armed force on humanitarian 
grounds has to respect the sovereignty rights of the intervened state and these 
sovereignty rights have to be balanced against humanitarian reasons, 
humanitarian interventions are justified if the traditional concept of territorial 
integrity of a sovereign state reaches its limit. This applies, for example, to 
conflicts which contain an inherent danger of cross-border effects and therefore 
an international dimension. 
F Necessity 
The element of necessity has a long history especially in context with a states' 
right to self defence. 254 It is a general principle of international law that "may excuse 
the non-observance of international obligations."255 Connecting the element of 
necessity with the law on the use of armed force, it becomes obvious that the actions 
of the military can only be legal when no other solution, which is short of armed 
force, is possible to resolve the conflict. Such an understanding sufficiently respects 
the dangers which result from the use of armed forces. The use of military weapons 
can only be legal "by way of a last resort after all peaceful means have failed. "256 
The United Kingdom Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention acknowledge 
this and list other possible instruments short of armed force to protect human rights 
such as "mediation ... , sanctions ... , observer missions . . . and international 
condernnation."257 Other possible means are classic diplomatic tools such as 
negotiation and discussion. 258 Also the EP and the report on The Responsibility to 
Protect refer to the idea of the use of armed force only being an ultima ratio even if it 
is used to protect human rights. 259 This proves the international acceptance for this 
element and its foundation in international law as a basic legal principle. 
Even though this paper discusses the possible elements of a legality test for 
humanitarian intervention independent of the written treaty law, the provisions of 
Chapter VII of the UN-Charter serve as a further clue that the element of necessity 
also has to be applied in context with humanitarian interventions. Article 41 of the 
254 See above V B I, page 16. 
255 Bin Cheng General Principles of Law (Stevens and Sons, London , 1953) 71. 
256 
Gardam, above n l , 5; see also "UN High-level Panel" , above n I, 207 (c) ; Jennings and Ward , 
above n 16, 439. 
257 "UK Guidelines on Humanitarian Intervention", above n 157, 957 . 
258 See "Ex inuria ius oritur", above n 50, 27 ; "UN High-level Panel ", above n I, para 100. 
259 
"Responsibility to Protect", above n 168, XII Principles for Military Intervention (2) B; "BT-
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UN-Charter excludes the use of armed force as a possible international means of 
coercion and lists other measures, such a " interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and 
severance of diplomatic relations", while Article 42 of the Charter allows the use of 
armed force "as may be necessary" when peaceful measures have shown to be 
inadequate. This graded system of possible actions of the United ations stresses the 
importance of the element of necessity, which also should be adopted as an element 
of a customary law of humanitarian intervention. 
The effotis of the international community to find a solution in the Kosovo 
conflict, which is short of armed force, serve as an example for putting the element of 
necessity into action. Prior to the military actions by armed NATO forces a lot of 
diplomatic negotiations with the Yugoslavian government took place. For example, 
the UN envoy Richard Holbrooke "had visited Belgrade repeatedly in 1998 and early 
1999 ... to induce Milosevic to accept a diplomatic solution."260 This "diplomatic 
effort ... culminated in the Rambouillet Agreement ... [ which was not signed by 
Belgrade and therefore] maintains that diplomatic options were exhausted."261 The 
Rambouillet Agreement stipulated the autonomy of the Kosovo region while at the 
same time maintaining the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
As a result, the element of necessity is a basic principle of international law 
which also has to be adopted for the test of whether a humanitarian intervention was 
lawful. Already the elements of priority of self-help and priority of conflict 
prevention describe that there exist measures in international law which have to be 
applied prior to the use of armed force. In respect thereof, these two elements are 
special appearances of the element of necessity. The justification of military actions 
for the protection of human rights presupposes the exhaustion of peaceful efforts 
made by the international community to find a conflict so lution. 
G Proportionality 
Similar to the element of necessity, the element of proportionality has a long 
history in international law. 262 This element "prohibit[s] di proportionate attacks and 
means and methods of warfare cau ing superfluou tnJury or unnecessary 
26° Falk, above n 5,850; see also chroeder, above n 43, 186. 
26 1 Schroeder, above n 43, 186; see Falk, above n 5, 850; Stromseth , above n 121, 249. 262 See above V, B, I, page 16. 
49 
suffering."263 The legitimacy of the use of armed force requires "at the very least, that 
it do [ es J more good than harm. " 264 
The main purpose of this element in context with humanitarian interventions 
1s to avoid los es or injuries among the troops of the intervener and among the 
civilian population of the intervened state. It encompasses "the obligation to respect 
the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of all civilians."265 "The scale, 
duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum 
necessary to secure the defined human protection objective. "266 This indicates that 
there must be a balance between the used mean for the protection of human rights 
and the evils that shall be eradicated by the u e of this means. 26 7 The justification of 
the use of armed force therefore always has to take the vio Jenee it generates itself into 
consideration. 
1 Example Kosovo conflict 
An example of the importance of the element of proportionality can be found 
when A TO actions in Kosovo were discussed. One of the main arguments of the 
critics, which regard the actions of ATO in Kosovo as a breach of international law, 
was that NATO disregarded the element of proportionality. Even if ATO wanted to 
avoid collateral damages, the bombing operations in Kosovo resulted in at least 500 
reported deaths within the civilian population. Moreover, the air strikes led to huge 
environmental damage in the Kosovo region. These were main arguments against the 
proportionality of the use of armed force in Kosovo. 268 Contrary to that, the 
supporters of the Kosovo intervention argued that the element of proportionality was 
kept by the ATO forces because "the duration of ATO's action was limited and 
the overall operation was placed under UN authority within a reasonable period."269 
263 Gardam. above n I. I 0; see also Charney. above n 113. 839. 
264 Stromseth. above n 121 . 267-8; see also Chink.in. above n I 02. 844; Henry F Carey" tales. GO 
and Humanitarian intervention" in John Carey. William V Dunlap and R John Pritchard (eds) 
International Humanitarian Law: Challenges (Transnational Publishers. Ardsley. 2004) 155 who 
describes that "the cure cannot be worse than the disease". 
265 Chinkin. above n 102. 844. 
266 "Responsibility to Protect". above n 168. XII Principles for Military Intervention (2) C; see also 
"UK Guidelines on Ilumanitarian intervention". above n 157. 958; "UN High-level Panel . above n I. 
207 (d). 
267 See Schroeder. above n 43. 187. 
268 Schroeder. above n 43. 188; see also Cassese. above n 8. 796; compare Chinkin. above n I 02. 844. 269 Stromseth. above n I 21. 249. 
50 
2 Prospects of success 
Prior to an analysis of whether the used means are propo1tional in relation to 
the evils that are to be eradicated, the prospects of success of the use of armed force 
have to be examined. The intervening actor in a humanitarian intervention always 
has to consider whether "there is a reasonable chance of the military action being 
successful in meeting the threat in question. " 270 A pointless use of armed forces can 
never be proportional because the losses of human life, which usually occur when 
military actions are taken, can not be weighed up against a possible elimination of 
human rights violations. Rather, "the interveners will simply be exposing their 
soldiers and the target population to life-endangering situations without the hope of 
success that justifies the risks to be borne. "27 1 Therefore, a sufficient balance 
between the used means and the evils that hall be removed needs to con ider the 
level of likely success. 
It is difficult to define within one general clause when the prospects of 
success are sufficient to justify military actions. Because of the complexity of 
humanitarian interventions there will always remain some uncertainty about the 
chances of stopping human rights violations by the use of armed force. Therefore, the 
deten11ination of the prospects of success of a humanitarian intervention has to be 
made on a case by case basis. 
3 Limitation of the purpose of milita1y actions 
Another important aspect of the element of proportionality is the limitation of 
the purpose of military actions. The use of armed force has to be u ed "exclusively . . . 
for the limited purpose of stopping the atrocities and resto ring respect for human 
rights [and] not for any goal going beyo nd this limited purpose."272 This is also 
stressed by the EP, when it states that the intervention has to be limited to specific 
aims and is allowed only to have trivial political effects on the authority of the 
intervened state.273 The need for a strictly limited purpose of humanitarian 
interventions prevents the emergence of the prejudice that humanitarian grounds 
serve only as a cover for more egoistic motives of military action. 
270 "UN High-level Panel", above n 1, para 207 (e) ; "Responsibi lity to Protect", above n 168, para 
4.41, page 37. 
27 1 Stromseth , above n 12 1, 268 . 
272 "Ex inuria ius oritur", above n 50, 27; see a lso "UN l li gh- level Panel", above n I, para 207 (b); 
compare Jennings and Ward. above n 16, 439, who claim that interventions have to raise issues " that 
are justifiable before an international tribunal". 
273 " BT-Drucksache 12/7513", above n 128, para 10 f). 
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However, the claim that only a trivial effect on the politics of the intervened 
country is allowed, is difficult. The use of armed force to enduce a different 
behaviour in a foreign state invariably means a change of the foreign government's 
politics, even if the force is used to protect human rights. An example for this can be 
found in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. Although the UN-SC Resolution 1244 
on the situation in Kosovo reaffirmed "the overeignty and territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"274 "it was not possible to top the ethnic cleansing 
. . . without a significant impact upon [Yugoslavia's] governmental authority 
structures and [its] territorial integrity. "275 
4 Interim result 
The discussion about the element of proportionality has indicated, that it is not 
possible to state within one general clause whether a humanitarian intervention was 
proportional or not. This element stresses the need for weighing up all po sible 
circumstances that surround certain humanitarian interventions. The determination of 
whether a humanitarian intervention was proportionate and therefore lawful has to 
remain as a case by case decision. 
VIII CON CL US/ON 
This paper has shown that at least in the "western" world a local custom of 
humanitarian intervention has emerged. The series of interventions on humanitarian 
grounds, which took place within the last 20 years, prove the existence of a 
consistent state practice. Moreover, an opinio juris of the states regarding 
humanitarian interventions as an act of law and, under certain circumstances, as an 
international obligation has to be ascertained when the states' behaviour and 
statements in international relations are investigated. 
The customary right to humanitarian intervention exi ts alongside treaty law. 
In respect of the strict limitations which the -Charter set on the legality of the 
use of armed force, this paper has pointed out 7 elements which have to be observed 
when military actions are taken for humanitarian rea ons. Thus, a test of whether 
humanitarian interventions can be justified con ist of the following elements: 
274 UNSC Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) /RE 1244 (1999) page 2 
http: daccessdds.un .org doc U DOC GI:. 99 172 89 POi 9917289.µdf!OpenLlcmenl (accessed 
18 February 2008). 
275 Stromseth, above n 121, 250; see also Chinkin, above n I 02, 845. 
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• Convincing evidence of massive human rights violations; 
• Priority of conflict prevention; 
• Priority of self-help; 
• Actions must be taken by a legitimate actor; 
• Actors show respect for the territorial integrity and overeignty 
rights of the intervened state; 
• Actions are necessary; 
• Actions are proportional. 
Even though the author regards these elements to be sufficient for a 
determination of whether a legal use of armed force took place, the complexity of 
international relations requires the maintenance of a certain grade of flexibility when 
the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention is investigated . The discussion in this 
paper has shown that the application of every single element of the test of 
justification requires detailed observance of the circumstances that surround the 
respective intervention. Therefore, the determination of whether a humanitarian 
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